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Despite a common heritage of institutions and  *  The importance of the former Soviet um-
arrangements for economic planning and trade  brella.
clearing, and their almost simultaneous adoption
of reform, the countries participating in Eastern  *  Indicators of relative indebtedness.
Europe's  economic transformation differ greatly
in economic performance and market expecta-  *  The flow of funds to the region, by source,
tions of performance.  from 1989 on.
Mukherjee examimies  those differences as the  *  The maturity of commercial debt and
region's economic transformation nears its third  especially the magnitude of short-term debt.
anniversary, focusing on the underlying factors
that drive private capital flows - from both  * The identity of "other private creditors," and
commercial lenders and foreign investors.  factors that affect the amount of project finance
and foreign direct investment available.
Improved creditworthiness - or the ability
to attract voluntary private-sector finance for  *  The setup of emerging financial institutions.
successively longer periods, with fewer guaran-
tees required - is a major signal that the eco-  *  Long-term commercial flows - especially
nomic reforms are beginning to take hold.  bond finance (access to the Eurobond market for
medium- and long-term funds).
Mukherjee examines the different stages on
the road to creditworthiness at which she finds  The region is not well known to lenders that
the Eastern European countries. Hungary and  might be able to meet its many emerging needs
Czechoslovakia (CSFR) are the only countries  for financing. And the few statistics available
that can issue medium- to long-term sovereign  may be doubtful or misleading in the context of a
bonds held by private investors (the ultimate test  market economy. Mukherjee bases her observa-
of creditworthiness, by some standards). In  tions largely on interviews with people in
Hungary, maturities on the most recently issued  commercial banks and investors active in Central
deutschemark bonds now extend as long as  and Eastern Europe. All data have been provided
seven years; private placements of yen are even  by those sources and by country reports issued
more favorable - extending to ten years.  by the Institute of Internationai Finance. The
latter is a major source of figures used by private
Mukherjee identifies and compares cross-  lenders when they assess a borrower's prospects.
country infonnation about some of the factors
that influence differing market perceptions of
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and
Romania. Among factors discussed:
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This exercise was undertaken  in order to examine  gary,BulgariaandPoland.1n.bormationonmarketpercep-
selected  cross-country  aspects  of the unprecedented  re-  tions was obtained as a result of numerous interviewsl
gional economic  transformation  taking  place in eastern  with commercial  banks and a  few investors active in
Europe. Despite the common heritage of institutions,  central  and eastern Europe  (CEE). 2
economic  planning  and trade  clearing  arrangements,  and
the almost  simultaneous  adoption  of reforms,  cle ir  differ-  The  first  section  summarizes  and  compiles  cross-coun-
ences in  performance  and  expectations  are evident  across  try findings  in the following  areas:
countries  as the regional  transformation  process  passes  its
second  anniversary.  A. The importance  of the Soviet  umbrella:
A large  set of financing  needs  has emerged  in  a region  B. Indicators  of relative  Indebtedness;
which  is not well  known  to  its potential  lenders,  and  even
in the few cases where detailed  statistics  are available,  C. A summary of funds flowing to the region, by
they  may  be doubtful  ormisleading  inamarketcontext In  source,  from 1989  onwards;
this situation,  it may be instructive  to explore  the under-
lying  factors driving private capital  flows, both from  D. A  discussion  of the maturity  profile  of commercial
commercial lenders and foreign investors. Improved  debtinparticularthemagnitudeofshorttermdebt;
creditworthiness,  or the ability  to  attract  voluntary  private
sector  fiace  for successively  longer  periods  and  requir-  E. Project finance and direct foreign investment:
ing fewer  guarantees,  is a major  signal  that  the economic  who are "other private creditors"? What factors
reforms  are beginning  to take hold,  and are recognized  as  influence  the amount  of project  finance  available?
such  by the markeL  Countries  in  the region  are at different
points along the road to creditworthiness,  and the paper  F. The institutional  setup of the emerging  financial
attempts  to look  at this more  closely.  Certainly  Hungary  sector,  and
and CSFR  are me only  countries  with  the ability  to issue
medium to long-ten  sovereign  bonds held by private  G. Long term commercial  flows, in particular  bond
investors  (the ultimate  test of creditworthiness,  by some  finance: access  to theEurobond  market  formedium
standards).  In the case of Hungary,  the maturities  of the  term  and long term funds.
most recently  issued  DM  bonds  are now  as long  as seven
years, and Yen private  placements  are even more favor-  Part UI  of the paper contains  further  details  for indi-
able, extending  up to ten years.  vidual  countries.  At data have  been  provided  bycommer-
cial banks or country  reports issued by the Institute  of
Part I of this  paper aims  at identifying  and summariz-  International  Finance  (IIF),  since  these  figures  are used  by
ing some of the factors which influence the market's  private  lenders  when  assessing  theprospects  ofaparticu-
differing  perceptions  of Czechoslovakia,  Romania,  Hun-  lar borrower.
'.  Interviews  were conducted  in October  1991.
2.  In keeping  with the original  intention  of basing  this paper on market  perceptions  of the region,  every attempt  has been  made to
avoid  using  World  Bank  or other  multilateral  sources  for data  presented  here.
1Part I: Introduction-Developments  from 1989 to 1990
The table below highlights  some of the issues this  foreign  investment  (DFI).  This is of course  also related  to
paperis  seeking  to folow upon.Clearly 1990  was  the year  the sovereign  government's  direct market access to bor-
of greatest  uncertainty,  with  negative  transfers (or  at best  rowing  for balance  of payments  support.  Earlier findings
zero,  in the case of Poland)  to commercial  banks  from all  have  showu  that  the sovereign  govermment  borrowing  rate
countries  in the region.  The picture  has  changed  in 1991,  usually  sets a benchmark,  and that the cost of funds for
as shown  in subsequent  tables  in this paper.  enterprises  is heavily  influenced  by sovereign  risk. 3Private
sector  flows will  set the tone for the relative  ease of future
It is widely  accepted  that  few  if any sovereign  debtors  access  to all international  capital flows.
in the rgion are likely  to have  access  to general  purpose
commeicial  bank funding in the next five years.  At the  A.  The Soviet Umbrella, or a Different Set of Rules
same time, the table below supports  the anecdotal  evi-  for the Region in the 1980s?
dence that there are some private capital iinflows,  espe-
cially for Hungary, Czechoslovakia  and Poland. The  Under  the old CMEA  arrangements,  it was  a common
paper will examine the size and creditor  composition  of  assumption  among  western  bankers  that  the  USSR  would
funds flowing to the region since 1989.  In particular,  it  notpermititsalliestodefaultonhard-currencyobligations,
will  examine  the types of financial  instruments  which  are  and that in effect loans to the region were implicitly
being used  to channel  private sector  fiuds, such  as short  backed  by Soviet  gold  reserves  in a worst-case  scenario.
term trade lines,  project  financing,  equity  investments  in  This, together with a solid track record of prompt and
joint ventures,  syndicated  loans,  offsets  and countertrade  timely debt servicing,  explains  why the region was still
etc. The implications  for relative  seniority  of post-1989  able to attact  hard currency on very favorable  terms
commercial  inflows wifl  be of great interest  in this con-  throughout  the 1980s  when  banks  were  already  facing  the
text, and efforts  have  been  made to learn  about collateral  reality  of insolvent  debtors with similar  debt ratios else-
or guarantees  extended  to investors  in financing  projects.  where  in the world.
The term "financial  market  access"  is extended  in this  Both  Hungary  and Poland  had debt/GDP  ratios  higher
paper  to include  the ability  of the enterprise  sector  to raise  than Brazil's, for examnple.  In fact, Hungary  was quite
funds  in  the  capital  markets  e.g  suppliers'credits  and  direct  comparable  to Mexico  and Argentina  in terms of debt/
Table  1: Private Commercial Finance and Relative  Indebtedness at the Turning Point in CEE (in US$ million)
Bulgaria  Czechoslovakia  Hungary  Poland  Romania
1989  1990  1989  1990  1989  1990  1989  1990  1989  1990
Commercial  Banks,  1,114  203  783  -271  529  -1,670  -388  0  -281  -6
net credit  flows
Commercial  Banks,  0  294  0  0  0  0  145  796  0  0
interest  arrears  outst.
Other  private  creditors,  675  -140  -189  221  818  677  -287  103  -47  -52
net credit  flows
Equity  Investment.  0  5  26  50  180  337  15  10  0  0
net Flows
Extenal Debt to  7,256  8,223  5,648  5,349  13,269  12,642  8,580  10,627  248  252
commercial  Banks
MLT  Extenal Debt to  4,924  5,057  2795  3,120  10,574  10,981  7,360  8,386  1  0
commercial  Banks
Total External  Debt  10,224  11,030  8,183  8,085  20,537  21,481  41,387  49,019  582  518
DOD/Total  Exports  252.7  329A  112.4  102  241.4  236.9  474.4  383.8  8.7  12.8
Percent  of Total External  52.3  52.3  30.6  26.8  23.8  22.3  31.7  37.2  69.2  60.3
Debt in US$
Source: Staff estimates  based on Country  Repous  of dhe  Insiute  of Intemational  Finance  (RF)  dated November  91 through  January  1992
3.  Successive  bond issues  by Mexican  public  enterprises  in 1990  were  reportedly  carried  out as part  of a strategy  to buildon  a
consistently  solid track  record  for  bond debt payments  and to demonstrate  the increasingly  improved  tenis for borrowers-the
yields fell from 17%  in June 1989  to 11%  in September  1990.  Foreign  borrowing  authorities  in the Mexican  govermment  reportedly
consider  these  as benchmark  rates which  are intended  to support  the Mexican  private  sector's reentry  into  the international  capital
makets.
2GDP, and yet continued to have uninterrupted  access to  The foilowing  charts (Figs. 3 and 4) for Hungary  and
commercial  lending  throughout  the 1980s.  Bulgaria have been included to emphasize the point.
Hungary  hasbeen  theregion's  largestdebtortocommercial
banks, but mainly  due to its good debt servicing  record,
Figure 1l:Debt  to GDP  Ratio  has been able to access large volumes  of funds at below
l 211  LIBOR  in the second  half of the 1980s.  Bulgaria,  which
1 2~ ~  was perceived  by bankers  to be most closely associated
l  00____________ /with  the ex-USSR  and therefore  the main  beneficlary  of I  -*-  0  the "umbrella",  enjoyed  the largest  negative  spreads  rela-
80 1  U  tive  to  US$LIBOR  until 1989.  The contrast  in  the relatdve
t*  .o  -0---  wfortunes  of the two  after 1989  is clearly  seen  in  the figures.
60 *  While  LIBOR  is declining  from 1989-1992,  the "average
I4-0-Ar  *-gentina  rate" for Bulgaria  is on an upward trend. For Bulgaria,
40_-  Hgun  gay  though,  the information  from 1990  onwards needs  to be
20 -- interpreted  with caution.  The below  LIBOR  reading for
1990  arises from  non-payment  of interest  for  6 months  of
0 *  a  thatyear. After  1990,  ithasbeencalculatedon  thebasisof
qn  tn  to  a)  c  CD c  c  c  co  co  co  unpaidobigations.  In contrastto  Hungary,Bulgaria  does
a,  CD  as  a)  C  C  a)  nothaveaccesstofunds  attheratesindicatedfor 1991  and
Source:  Staff  estifmtes based  on IIF  Reports.  1992  in  Figure  5.  For Hungary,rates  relative  to  LIBOR  are
declining  after 1990,  i.e. following  the same  pattern  as the
Detailed information  on actual interest  rates paid on  underlying  cost of funds.
different  types  of loans  throughout  the 1980s  is very  hard  Figure 3. Huncary
toobtain.  Both commercial  banks  and  country  authorities  Averaae  Interest rare  on  external
acknowledge  that spreads for CEE sovereign  debtors  debt
were often negative  for trade lines and general purpose
loans, reaching  over 100  basis points below LIBOR in  1  0-
many cases. The following  chart provides  a rough indi-  9
cation  of the favorable interest  rates that were enjoyed  8
under  the Soviet  umbrella,  in spite  of the high  debt  ratios.  ,  7  6  Hray
It traces  the gross interest  payments  in a given  period  as a  6  6  LI
percentage  of the average  total  extemal debt,  relative  to  5  S  n-tSSLIOR
the average  six-month  dollar  LIBOR.  4  4  average)
In 1988 and 1989, all countries in the region  2  2
average interest rates below LIBOR (Bulgaria  paid the  1
lowest).  This trend reversed  in 1990.  Poland  is the only  °  I
country  to  register  actual  rates below  LIBOR  in 1991  and  co  c  0  ^
1992,  but this is due to non-payment  of obligations.  Source  Staff estinstes based  on IIF  reports
Figure  2: Average  Interest Rate  on  Flqure 4: Bulearle
Commercial  Debt  Average  Interest rate on external
debt
7  Ha--- y  8!Bli
C  6.  -. 4.
u  54  *  - CSFR  C  6*
e  4  . - O  USSL113R 4-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4
0.  3 . Poland  4  (6 nonth
2  . *  uSS  LBOR  2
1  (6 month
0  i  - verage)  0  4-;  II 
0)  c  - - 11)  co
0  oa  0co  4  a0  CD
CD  0)  0)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ~CD  0)  )
Source:  Staff estimates  based  on IF Re  F  rtst  Source:  Staff emaMtes  b;d  on  I  IFCountry  Reports
3B. Indicators of Relative  Indebtedness in the Region  Figure6clearlyshowstheunsustainabilityof  Bulgaria's
debt situation  in 1989-the country's  debt  service  obliga-
The  followingcharts  illustrate  relative  levels  of indebt-  tions,  which  were met fully  and on Lime,  consumed  74.4
edness  in  the region,  before  and after  the disappearance  of  percent of total export earnings.  For Hungary,  the debt
the Soviet  umbrella  in 1990.  The ratio  of debt service  to  service to exports ratio incicabod  marginally  between
exports  in Figure  6 has  been  chosen  to shed more  light  on  1989  and 1990  (from  44 to 47 percent)  and has dropped
the information presented in Figure 5, to  illustrate  sharply  to around  30 percent since  then.  The debt reduc-
sustainability  in addition  to indebtedness.  tion  agreement  together  with  non-payment  of commercial
obligations  has lowered  the ratio  for Poland  from  50 to  20
Figure 5 shows  that Poland's total debt/exports  ratio  percentbetween  1989  and 1991.  Romania's  sharp  decline
was almost  double  that  of Hungary  in 1987.  This  ratio has  in debt  service  ratio  appears  to follow  a pattern  similar  to
Bulgaria's, peaking  a year earlier.  (The background  in
Figure 5: Ratio of Total Debt to Total Exports*  each case is of course very different). The ratio for
Romania  now appears  to be holding  constant  at about 2
600  percent  of export earnings.
500  C. Summary of Funds Flowing  to the Region Post-
400  RoC-  gs  1989
300  Multilateral and bilateral financing has been the only
- "WY  Hwssource  of significant  positive  transfers  to the region  since
200  ^  ^  - *-C5fR  1989. However, after the adoption  of the far-aching
ref )rms  supported  by this financing,  the supply  response
' °°  0  .- '  -.  wiL ultimately  depend on the interest displayed  by the
I  ,,  fore,  qn private  sector  in a  given country.  It is widely
";  '  ..  1  1  1ackn  wledged that  foreign direct investment and exports 0  qa  cn  W  X  WiU  have  to  be the engine  of growth  in  the region.  A  newly
created  enterprise  will be dependent  on foreign  savings,
^4 TtlEn  rh  Onsf  g  srv^merreE
=W8.4  irowert  U.=ft,Or*  PM  foreign  technology  and foreign  management  methods  if it
wishes to penetrate non-traditional markets  and pass
been declining  for Poland  and Hungary,  remaining  rela-  through  a successful  transition  to  establish  market-based
tively constant  for CSFR  and sharply  increasing  fo. Bul-  links with  other  economies.  Overall,  the extent  to which
garia  and Romania.  The policy  change  adopted  by Roma-  enough enterprises  in a given economy have access to
nia with  regard  to external  debt after 1990  is particularly  foreign  capital  or foreign  investors,  will  have  an important
evident  in  Figure  5. The debt  reduction  granted  to Poland  effect  on economic  performance.  The table below  shows
in 1990  by the Paris  Club reduced  the ratio for Poland  by  the role of each  type of creditor.
about  90  percentage  points  compared  to  the previous  year.
Table  2: Net Borrowing from Official  Sources'
(in US$million)
Figuro  6: Ratlo  of Debt  Service  to Total Exports  *  1989  1990  1991  1992(e)
80  Hungary  -79  346  1,540  843
70  CSFR  84  365  2,264  1,059
60  Bulgaria  490  -154  915  905
Poland  n.a.  2,986-  1,245-  1,750
SO  cm--  oa,  Romania  -1,403  -20  1,295  1,475
40  ;'  Net Borrowing  from other  Private  Creditors
30  '  -@--*P,m,d  (US$  million)
20  __  \  _.-  1989  1990  1991  1992(e)
10  Hungary  818  677  550  443
CSFR  0  221  -201  167
I  °  Bulgaria  675  -140  -150  -15
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  Poland  na.  103  40  -115
(El)  CP)  Pln  a  0  0  -1
C=  ,"ffii-Ws  '  1  OltRomania  -14  -52  125  125
aTable2(con't):Net  Boffowing from Commercial  Figure  8: Net Borrowing  by Source  -
Banks (US$miiion)  1  990
22  19  9  I22  2(e)
Htmgary  529  -1,670  -1,150  -935
CSFR  469  -271  -364  -176  40M
Bulgaria  1,114  497  685'  7001  3000_
Poland  n.a.  796  850-  855-  r
Romania  -278  -6  200  125
i  1000  llD
(.)  Includes  IMF, IBRD, and  other  multilateral  creditors  0 
and official  bilateral  sources.  a  -l0J
(  Includes  rescheduling  of interest  and principal.  -2000X
In 1989  Romania  was  the only  country  making  major  e
negative  transfers  from  the region,  and this was  based on
deliberate  government  policy. The negative transfer  to-
talled US$1.7  billion, of  which US$1.5  billion was to  ONettorrowingfrom  *sNetborrowlngtrom  ENetbowrowingfrom
official  creditors.  Other  private  creditors  were an impor-  comiwlcl  banks  other  p.  - te  official wrca
tant source of funds for Hungary  and Bulgaria  in 1989.  cedites
Commercial banks lent more to Bulgaria than to any other  s  o-cC  btf  estimates  D1ew  0  IIF  1nty  NOWTS
country  in the region  that  year,  amounting  to  over  US$  1.1
billion.
The  following  charts illustrate  the developments  since  borrowing  from  commercial  banks  reflects  unpaid  obliga-
1989:  tions, and the figures  for Poland  mainly  result from the
official  debt reduction  deal.
FIlure  7: Net Borrowing by Source - AsshowninFigure9,theofficialsectoristhepredomi-
1  9  8  9  nantsourceoffundsineverycountryintheregionin  1991.
CSFR is the largest recipient in dollar terms, with net
borrowing  of almost  US$2.5  billion.  Again,  the commer-
2000  - I  l 1S11 * g  cialbankpresenceforPolandandBulgariareflectsunpaid
o  150  ooo  li  t  #  Sl  rLobligations  rather  than new lending.  Other pnvate credi-
2  -1000  ll 
a  1500  1| 
-2000  Figure 9: Net  Borrowing by Source  -
,,,  85  - |  1991 (Estimate)
I  3  tr  ~~~~~~~~~2000-  ; 
a Net borrowing from  t  o  Net borrowig  fg  frm  c
ctewcIai  btas  otherprivate  offidcial  1w0
credit  n  500  l
Sou cc  Waf  esum  ateas osn  a  IotryFeporta  M  . 00
-1 000  -
Figure 7 shows Romania  and Bulgaria  making  large  -15  t.  ,*
nettransferstoofficialsources.  Also,forBulgariaitisthe  a'
last major bofrowing  episode from OECD commercial  ' 
banks. The situation  changed dramatically  in 1990,  as
shown in Figure 8. Commercial banks retreated massively  aNetborrowirngfrom  U  Netborrowingfrom  Ut  tborrowingfrom
from Hungary (net negative transfer of US$1.8 billion)  coofwrciul bet  otherprivate  officialsource
and to a lesser  extent  from CSFR.  Other  private  creditors  IrnF  in 
were the  main source  of funds  for Hungary.  Bulgaria's  net  Source  taf  tif  00  an  Itfy  K*W%G
5Flsure  10:  Net Borrowing  by Source - For Romania, the impactof large prepaymentof  offi-
1  99?  (Pro  lected)  cial obligations from 1988 onwards resulted in a jump in
the importance of commercial debt to a peak of about 50%
3000  in 1990. Again, with large new borrowings from ofCcial
creditors  in  1991 and  beyond,  the  relative  weight  of
commercial debt falls to below 20% of the total debt.
2000.-
15.  soO  - - -Bulgaria's  unresolved  debt overhang  is clear in Figure
500-  I ~~~~~~~~~1;  commercial  banks  have  the  highest  relative  exposure
to  Bulgaria in the region. The  role of commercial creditors
c  _  __  _  is declining in CSFR and Hungary as the banks retreat
-soo-  through negative net  transfers, and it is relatively constant
-1000-  m _| s  w  E  w ,x, |  ,x,at  about 25% of the total in Poland.
I  =
Relative  Importance  of Short  Term  Commercial  Debt
O  Nrt  borrovIng  f  rom  0 Net  borrowing  f  ran  U  Net  borrowinO  f  rom
coarieclol  bat  other  prvate  otficlel  "we"e
cmitore  Another characteristic of commercial debt that varies
sIk.x  We  ItaT  II*irMttS  Deft on t mewO(t&  in the region is the maturity  profile, or the relative im-
portance of short term commercial obligations. If acoun-
try experiences a liquidity crisis or other debt servicing
difficulties, holders of its short term debt are at greatest
tors  have  almost  disappeared  completely  except  from  Filaure  12:  1989
Hungary.  Commercial  banks  continue  to  retreat  from
Hungary  (net  negative  transfer  of  US$1.2  billion)  and
CSFR.  10.
In  Figure  10,  the  outlook  for  1992  is  much  the  same  in  80%.
terms of the relative  importance  of each type of creditor.
Theonlychangeis  thatotherprivatecreditorsareexpected
to  make  some  positive  transfers  to CSFR  and  Hungary,  40%
although  less  tha in  the  previous  year  for Hungary..  20%
Characteristies  of  Commercial  Lending  to the  Region  0 %
The  relative  exposure  of commercia.  banks  may be  i  =  !  c
judged  by the following:  I  j
0short Term  Comwmercil  Debt  E3 Neaum  to  LoNg  TeOm  Coormcl|
SC  ZrcOTT estimffses  do on  iI  Lou,uy toeport.L
Figure  11:  Ratio  of Commercial  Debt  to
Total Debt  risk,  since such  claims  are costly  for banks  to resciedule.
Bulgaria  in particular  is unable to service  even  its siot
0 8  term debt,  and banks are reportedly nervous about setting
0:7  i.  -a"7  gmi  a precedent  by  allowing  any  kind  of  restrucairing  or
0.6  ~-.O........°CSFR  reduction of  these claims.  Figures  12 and  13 show  the
0  5t  relative  share  of  short  term  obligations  in commercial 0.4  t  debt.
0.3  - Pol\e  d
0.2  . .|  *-.-Rb  l  As seen in Figure  11, commercial  banks  have clearly
0.1  been Hungary's  major source of financing in the pasL
o  °  I  l  cl  @  _  i_  §  Their  exposure  is in  fact  many  times  that  of  the other
aX  0  o  !  creditors  put  together.  Within  Hungary's  total debt,  only
about  16% is in the form  of ST obligations.  In CSFR  too,
Sese Staff  "UmeebhBedon  IFCCoemtryprt  commercial  banks  have the largest  exposure  by creditor
6category.  Withincommercial  debt,acuriousphenomenon  Proportion of Merebandise Imports Financed by ST
is observed:  CSFR  and Romania  both  have more  ST than  Commercial Debt
long term obligations.  Poland has a very low share of
commercial  debt altogether,  of which a relatively  tiny  All countries  except Poland  and Romania  appeared  to
share has  been in the form of ST obligations,  even  as far  rely on short term credits in 1989.  We assume that an
important  proportion  of these represented  trade lines. It
Figure  13:  1992  (Prolected)  may be argued that these figures  reflect inhenited  condi-
Flaure  15: 1900
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back as 1986.4  Also,  Poland's entire ST obligations  are  1  00%
owed to commercial  creditors.  Commercial  banks have
thelargestexposure  of allcreditorcategoriesin  Bulgaria.
A majorpartof commercial  exposure  is in STclaims,  but
overall  these  form  arelatively  small  shareof  the  total  debt.
Romania's  external debt is very low for well-lown  o|
reasons.  The share of ST commercial  obligations  is ex-  - X-
pectedtodeclinefrom99%in 1989toabout9O%in  1992,  c
as shown  in Figure 13.
Finally,  the following  chart  provides  a rough
indication  of the  region's  reliance  on trade  finance,  by  Flour,  IT:  1992 (Prolected)
comparing  hard  currency  merchandise  imports  to short
term commercial  borrowing  in the corresponding
period.
1 00%0
Figure  14: 1989  |
20%  I%,.JjJ  OX
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Ig  ,~  S  L  tions,  and are  based  on borrowing  and lending  decisions 40  made according to outdated assumptions,  such as the
8  Soviet  umbrella  or the presumption  that  all loans  carried  a
4.  Perhaps  Poland  was  not perceived  by banks to  be ftilly under  the Soviet  umbrella  since  the early 1980s.
7government  guarantee.  The Romanian  case is curious:  D. Maturity Profile of Total External Debt
borrowing  from commercial  banks in 1989  was US$248
million,  of which  US$247 million  was short  term. Mer-  Given tde discussion  in the preceding  sections  of the
chandise  imports  in 1989,  however,  were  US$3.41  billion.  relative  importance  of commercial  debt,  and the maturity
According  to IIF statistics,  reserves  increased  that  year  by  profile  of this debt, it may be useful  to contemplate  the
overUS$1  billion.  Obviously,Romaniadoesnotappearto  maturity  profile of overall  obligations  to hard currency
have financed  its imports  through short term credits, al-  creditors  in  the region.  Table  3 below  shows  relative  shares
though  bankers  always  say  that the only  business  they  did  of  short  term  and  long  term  total  financial  flows  for different
(and  still  do) with  Romania  is short  term  and trade  related.  countries:
Poland  imported  a total  of about US$7  billion  of merchan-
dise in 1989,  and borrowed  a little over US$1  billion in  Hungary  and  Poland  have  remarkably  small  portions  of
short term commercial  loans  that year.  ST  debt outstanding  relative  to their long  term obligations.
ForCSFR,medium  andlong  term  debtisgrowing  while  short
By 1990  (Fig. 15) the share  of short tenn commercial  term  debtis  falling.  ForRomaniaboth  categories  aregrowing
debtwassharplyreducedforHungaryandCSFR,whilefor  dramatically.  The figures  for Bulgaria  mainly  reflect the
Poland  it remained  roughly  constant.  (The figure  for Bul-  effects  of the moratorium.
garia  reflects  the moratorium  and  three  month  rollovers,  in
particular  arrears  and  penalty  interest  which  is recorded  as  Table  4  looks  atflows of short  term  debt  from private
ST credits).  sources  in the  period  1989-1991,  with  commercial  banks'
projections  for 1992:
In 1991 the same figures  for CSFR and Hungary  fall
even  further,  with  the trend  expected  to  continue  in 1992  or  As indicated  earlier,  private  short  term flows  from  non-
at best remain  unchanged.  bank sources,  while modest,  will be more  important  than
from  commercial  banks.
Source:  Staff  estimates  based  on Institute  of Intemational
Finance  Country  Reports.
Table  3:  Breakdown of Total External Debt by Maturity (in US$ million)
198  199  199  199(f)
MLT  SI  MLT  a  MLT  a  hMJ  a
Hungary  17,230  3,307  18,541  2,940  19,090  3,055  18,267  3,382
CSFR  4,596  3,587  5,180  2,905  6,808  2,443  7,444  2,383
Bulgaria  7,520  2,704  7,402  3,272  7,864  3,125  8,415  3,054
Poland  37,061  1,295  46,625  1,339  47,676  1,384  46,891  1,302
Romania  269  313  167  352  1,166  985  2,785  1,009
Table  4: Net Short-term Flows to the Region'
1289  12  1291  12
Other  Other  Other  Other
Comnmercial  Private  Commercial  Privait  Commnercial  Private  Conunercial  Private
Hungary  -56  42  -1,200  555  0  110  180  200
CSFR  182  -71  -423  -70  -150  50  0  40
Bulgaria  388  93  374  -12  0  -8  0  3
Romania  149  -11  -5  -23  180  50  100  50
(')  This information was not available for Poland
8E.  Direct Foreign Investment-Project  Finance 5:  may  be briefly  sunmarized  here  in  the context  of the discus-
sion that  follows  on conditions  specific  to the CEE  region.
A very limited  subsector  of investors  may be ready to
acquire  fixed  assets  in  the region  if they  feel  the  investment  Thecforeig  treneur  approahe  asforen  omme . ,,  ,  . . ~~~~~~~~~~~~cial  bank,  which  will  then  conduct  a credit  assessment  of the
is "safe", and furthermore,  that they  may lose by going in  projecL  Traditionaly,  ths will be based  on the analysis  of
later  rather  than  now. 6 Which  of the commonly  mentioned  prjc.Taionlytiswlbebednthaayisf laterrather  noed  financial  statements,  and/or in  the case  of a start-up  project,
factors-educated  labor force, low wages, manufacturing  the analysis of security (mortgages, escrow accounts etc.)
skills,  political  stability-  is  more  important  to  new  foreign  ta  must  be furished by the project  sponsors.
investors?  Again,  why are some countries  preferred  over
others  for DFI?  What  is the situation  with regard  to repa-  A  drawback  of financial  statementanalysis  is thatbalance
triation  of profits  in the newly  adopted  foreign  investment  sheets  provide  information  on past  performance,  and such
laws  of the region?  Are investors  responding  to particular  analysis  implies  that ratios calculated  from these  numbers
incentives,  either in the host country or in their home  will  not  change  materially  in the  futwe.  It  may  be argued  that
countries? Does the attitude of export credit agencies  such  a static  view  is not admissible  in the case  of long  term
(willingness  to  provide  cover  only  in  some  countries)  have  finance  in an uncertain  environment,  especially  if  the size  of
a major  effect?  The mixed  answers  and lack  of clear  trends  investment  to be fuianced  is large  relative  to the size of the
in response to these questions indicates  that banks and  existing  assets.  Security  therefore  becomes  more  inportant,
investors  are still  operating  on a case by case  basis.  although  itposes  similarproblems  since  its valuation  is also
Most  of the DFI  is assumed  to be undertaken  in the for  based  on present considerations.  Furthermore,  in case of
recourse,  the valie of assets  pledged  as security  will  depend of a clearly  defined,  self-contained  project  that generates  . .er  .haa  -r  .tyi  .w  intpafoiath
its own  income.  The  project  is financed  with  a commercial  tm. th.i  has  a  curious effecb highly  paliz  and
bank loan. In other words, information  on DFI  and joint  eive  mach  i  oul  in  heory  pe  sfient
ventures  is taken  here as a qualitative  proxy for enterprise  claerin  term  shvalu  as meary  pro  hase  price
access  . to prjc  .ucn  E,mpiaecmm  ilsucs  collateral in terms of its value as measured  by purchase  price
a  roject  financ  ing  of  prvaeommential  res.  in  the west.  However,  the complementary  technological  and
Project  finance  at this stage of development  Inthepregio  managerial  sit  requirements  alone  may  constitute  a barrier
ihpaesanongtevio  inteestentbyaforeasingneisreturen  onequiwh  to entry for the particular  activity.  This would limit the has an obvious  interest  in increasing  his return  on equaty  demand  localy for  the equipment  in  the event  of liquidation
e  .lyd  i  h  leerg  e'ec  of  de  acn. 7 Th* a  of  the  business,and  thus  depress  its value  as  collateral.  Given
for  lending  is the future  cash  flow from  this  project,  and the 
loans are l y sthe  scarcity  of  westem  style  managerial  knowhow  in  the  CEE
loans are largely  secured by i) the project's  assets and Lii thle  reio  at  p  .wt  it is liel  .wcmecaak
contractual  arrangements  with  the project  participants.  An  regonn  at pesent  iiselikely  that  commerci  alb
eseta fe.r  of prjc  fiacn  is.  continue  to be  veo'  consevative  in their  valuation  of collateaL ewssntial featur  of project  flnancing  is that  the actual  ini-
tiators  and owners of the project no longer  assune full  Politicalriskcomprisesallmeasuresbypublicauthorities
liability  for the loans  and thus the risks  of the investment  thatimpairthecourseoftheprojectorthreatenitscommercial
project. Commercial  banks, and other project sponsors  success  as  a result  of  changes  in  the  original  legal  frameworkL
assume  a  part of the risks.  Examples  would be unilateral  changes in licensing,  tax,
Commercil bank attudes  toward  project  f.  environmental  and other  regulations,  belated  export  restric-
based  on a number  of criteria  which  are widely  known,  but  tions  or expropriation.
TableS: Country Risk Forecasts. 8
Insfik  Invel, Risk  Ex=  rtRisk  QrwQiUt  (%fla  I  n  oCwT  Afs.$b)
Bulgaria  B  (nc)  A  (B)  B+  (B-)  2.0  (nc)  10.0  (6.0)  -0.6  (-0.4)
CSFR  B  (nc)  A  (nc)  B  (nc)  2.0  (nc)  10.0  (nc)  -1.5  (nc)
Hungary  B-  (nc)  A  (nc)  B+  (nc)  1.5  (nc)  22.0  (nc)  -0.75  (-0.8)
Poland  B  (C+)  A+  (C-)  B-  (nc)  2.0  (2.5)  25.0  (20.0)  -0.55  (-0.5)
Romania  C  (nc)  C  (nc)  C-  (nc)  2.0  (nc)  15.0  (10.0)  -2.0  (nc)
5.  Note: in some  countries  eg. Hungary.  a portion  of DFI is  classified  as imports  and the remainder  is "other  private  creditors".  For all
countries  in the region,  it is  not clear what system  is used to keep  track  of DFI  as opposed  to suppliers'  credits  etc.
6.  It may be interesting  to consider  the impact  of IFI involvement  in attracting  foreign  investment-do long-time  (pre 1989)  foreign
investors  in general  prefer  (for  arbitrage  reasons)  the  distorted  policy  environment  that  prevails  prior to IFI  conditionality,  and are
they  likely  to withdraw  once the subsidies  are removed?  To date  there  appears  to have  been  no exodus  of such longtime  investors.
This would  indicate  that  there is still  a premium  on market  knowledge  and personal  contacts.
7.  "Project  Finance  from the Banks'  Perspective".  Paul  Grosse,  Deutsche  Banl AG.
'.  Source: Political  Risk  Services,  Syracuse  NY.
9Specialattention  ispaidbyprojectspoisorstotransferrisk,  pledge  of  anounts collected  in  an escrow  account  as well  as
i.e.thecountry'sabilitytomakepaymentsinforeignexchange,  title to  thefixed  assets  of the  project.  The latter,  however,  is
where investments  are financed in foreign  currency  but  not easily  achieved  due to lacking  mortgage  legislation  or
receipts  are in local currency. A critical  consideration  is  factuai  lity  ty  ooenfo  rcerightsincaseofforeclosure  ... In
whether  the country  as a whole  will  have sufficient  foreign  order  to structure  financing  in such a way that  it becomes  a
exchange  available  over the life of the projecL In critical  bankable  transaction  extremely  creative  structures  have  to  be
cases, where a country  ceases its external debt service  worked  out..." 9
payments  for lack  of foreign  exchange,  or agrees  on a  Offtake  refers  to the prior sale  of output  to specialized
restructuring  of its obligations,  the value  of  a transfer  guar-  trading  companies  whoarrange  for  the  sale  of given  volumes
anteefrom the central  bank is questionablefrom  the com-  in hard  currency.  Examples  were cited of CEE daiiy and
mercial  banks.  viewint.  This  is currently  the c.se in two  poultry  products  being  pre-sold  to  CFA  Zone  African  coun-
countries  in  the region,  Bulgaria  and  Poland.  tries  or other  LDC  governmental  food  importers  who  agreed
The situation  is different  if the project  output  is exported  to  pay  hard  currency.  In general,  Austrian  trading  companies
and  sold  for foreign  exchange  at world  market  prices.  In this  associated  with  banks  were  able  to  arrange  for such  tainsac-
case the project  generates  the necessary  foreign  exchange  tions  relatively  easily  since  they  say  they  have  over  80 years
itself.  The  banks  then  have  the possibility  of channelling  the  of experience  doing  such  deals  with  eastern  Europe.  Alterna-
receipts,withthecentralbank'sconsent,initiallytoaccounts  tively,  there are often  leasing  arrangements  with creative
outside the country  and of servicing  the debt in foreign  financing.  Forexample,  theSwedish  fumituremanufacturer
exchange  from these  accounts  (offshore  escrow  accounts).  IKEA  has  been  active  in  Poland  and  Hungary  for  20 years.  It
This  is a method  of substantially  limiting  the transfer  risk.  accepts  pieces  of  furniture  as installnent  payments  for facto-
Table 5 is an example  of commercially  available  risk as-  ries that  it has  set up in the region.
sessment  for the region that was published  in September
1991.  It shows  the 5-year  outlook  for Transfer  Risk,  Invest-  Most  market  sources  said that, except  for Hungary,  the
mentRisk,andExportRisl  "A+"  indicates  leastriskand"D-  interestelsewhere  was  in trading  rather  than  manfacturing.
-;indicates ighest  risk. The previous  forect  is shown  in  This  is consistent  with  the weak  legal  frameworks  which  do
parenthesi  if there has been a change;  (nc)  .dicates.no  not  provide  enough  seewity  to  equity  investors,  and  are not
parenthesifhrehsen  hng;()inats  conducive  to  strucwringcreativearrangements  asmentioned
change.  above.  Bankers  and investors  were very  clear  that the only
The Current Situation  in the Region-Seniority  Ac-  factor they considered  was the legalframework  and repa-
corded  to Project inance  triation  ofprofits.  Low  wages  and  other  characteristics  of the
labor  force  reporedly  would  not  enter  their  decision  making
All  banks  interviewed  for  this  paper  stated  that  as long  as  process.
therewasnorealconvertibilityoflocalcunrency,onlyprojects  The share  of the German  speaking  countries  (Germany,
which  generated  sufficientforeign  exchange  revenueswould  Austria  and  Switzerland)  in  Hungarian  foreign  trade  and  DFI
in  principle  qualiyforfinance  in hard  carrency.  The  cost  of  reached  40% in 1991-this corresponds  to the share  of the
this financing  is likely  to  be high  for the particular  project,  CMEA  area prior to 1989.  Bankers  in both Germany  and
since  as a prerequisite,  according  to an experienced  banker  Austia mentioned  that  Hungary  had  adopted  a legal  frame-
lenders  would  require  work  almost  identical  to the GermanJAustrian  one.  This  is
"adequate  cover to be provided  in favor of ft  lender  also the case in CSFR,  which  has had about a third  of its
"  adequate  cover to be provided  in  av  wf  the  se  business  dealings  with the German speakers  since 1989.
againstall  risks  inaherent  to the project  itself  as well  as utose  Answers  to the question  of whether  foreign  investors  were
risks  atibutable to the  economic  environ  ment  in  the  country  succeeding  in mobizng  domestic  resources,  were mixed.
the~~~~~~~~  ~  ~  .oroe  isdmc.di  bliyo  h  orwrt  Most  bankers  felt  that  foreign  investors  were  coming  in  with
freely  dispose  of its hard  curency receivables  would  require  thei own  fudn  d  thatith domestic  ciac  in
special  permit  from  the authorities,  available  only  in  excep-  thei  ron  were  etr  too  ual  dortoo  financialsc tori
tional  cases...Financings  are  structured  as  purchase  of re-  the  region  were  eia  too  unfamliaror  too  bureaucatic  to  be
. . _  . . tap~~~~~~~~Lped.  Several  bankers felt  tha foreign investors  were
ceivables,  offtake or factoring  type arrangements...  Due
to.insufficiency  or even total lack  of legal provisions  [on  . istanly  assumed  to be totaly creditworthy  by nationals
bankruptcy],  restrictive  foreign  exchange  policies  and un-  eagerly  looking  for  joint venture  partners.
settledrestitutionclaims,thestructuringofasecurity/seniority  According  tothe  Central  Statistical  Office,  3000  newjoint
arangementacceptabletowesternbanksoftentumsouttobe  ventures  were set up in Hungary  in the first  six months  of
a dreadful  exercise  ...  In general  a two  level  security  arrange-  1991,  with  the investment  of foreigners  amounting  to some
ment is demanded  comprising  direct access to the hard  US$350million.Thetotalnumberofjointventuesoperating
cwurencycashflow  ...  bytheassignmentofreceivablesandthe  in Hungary  at end-June  1991  was 8700.  The accumulated
9 Rosenmayr,  Edgar  in  "HardCurrency  Borrowings  from  Private  Sector  Banks".  p.23,  Creditanstalt  Bankvereirn  Vienna,  September  1991.
10statutory  capital  of firms  established  with  foreign  participa-  expected  for  sovereign  issues  (i.e.  borrowing  wherever  they
tion was US$4.4  billion,  a third  of which  was invested  by  can).
foreign  participants.  So  far no  data  are available  on the  exact  Wester commercial  banks  were  far  more  eager  to  discuss
geographical  distribution  of the foreign  investors,  but Ger-  their  impressions  of the newly  forming  commercial  banking
many,  Austriaand  USApreserved  theirlead  in  the  numberof  sector  in each of these  countries,  which  they believe  is an
joint ventures  set up.  USA  continues  to rank  fist according  important  prior  step  to managing  foreign  borrowings  in  any
to the total value  of investments.  According  to NBH only  strategic  way in future.
US$20  million  was  transferred  from  Hungary  in  repatriation
of profit  in the first six  months  of 1991.10  Institutional  Setup-Domestic Commercial  Banks
In Hungary,  foreign  investments  in the form  of non-cash  Throughout  theregion,  previously  the  State  Bankactedas
contributions  are classified  as imports.  In paricular,  import  bothacentralbankandacommercialbank,receivingsavings
data  includes  contribution  in-kind  by foreign  investors  to  the  from private  citizens  (channeled  to it through  the savings
statutory  capital  of newly set up joint ventures,  deliveries  banks) and passing them on to specialized  sectoral  credit
under leasing  agreements,  repayment  of earlier  Hungarian  banks. These credits were granted  in the framework  of a
credits to the Soviet Union by gas shipments  from the  "centralcreditplan"butnosanctionswereappliedincase  the
Yamburg  pipeline,  etc. According  to the Finance  Ministry,  credit  remained  unpaid.  The credit would  simply  be trans-
this  came  to  about  US$550  million  in the  first  seven  months  formed  into  a subsidy.
of 1991  this  year.  CSFR  is the  only  othercountry  in  the  region  This  load  of  bad  credit  portfolios  is in  the  very  early  stages
with  active  interest  on the  part  of foreigners  in  joint ventures.  of cleanup  at present,  and is compounded  by the general
F. Institutional Setup-How  is the Borrowing  Man-  problem  of insufficiently  capitalized  banks. The political
aged  Institutional  DifferentCounowries?  theBorrsensitivity  of selling  these  banks  to foreigners  was noted  by
aged in Different  Countries?  westem  bankers,  but all felt that  this  was the only  solution,
Under the previous  regimes,  convertible  currency  bor-  since  the  banks  in question  would  not  be able  to raise  capital
rowing  requirements  were  set administratively  and  incorpo-  on the international  markets  for many  years.
rated  into  the State  Currency  Plan.  The  Foreign  Trade  Bank  In this system,  no sophisticated  qualifications  were re-
was the authorized  bonrowing  arn of the Government  and  quired  for  bankers,  who were  predominantly  officers  of the
wouldcarryouttherequiredtransaction,withoutanyinputor  same kind as in the ministries.  This lack of experienced
participation  in a borrowing  strategy.  Bankers  stated  that  the  personnel  today  emerges  as the main  problem  in  setting  up  a
"Soviet  umbrella  effect", i.e. the markets'  belief that  e  modern  banking  sector, under which credits  can only be
USSR  would  bail  out its allies  rather  than  allowing  them  to  granted  to  companies  whose  prospects  can be evaluated  and
defaulton  western  obligations,  accounts  fora  large  partof  the  who  can offer some  collateral.  International  experience  is
access  on favored  terms  for  the  various  Foreign  Trade  Banks  also  lacking,  since  past  relations  withforeign  countries  were
through  the 1970s  and 1980s.  The most  important  reason  of  all concentrated  in one  institution.  In Hungary,  CSFR  and
course  is the prompt  and timely  commercial  debt servicing  Poland,  independent  banking  systems  have  been legislated
record  for the region  as a whole  prior  to 1989.  but currently  lack electronic  data  processing  equipment  and
What institutional  arrangements  have  replaced  the State  other  technology.
Curmncy  Plan?  What  is the new  allocation  of responsibility  The first  steps  towards  a two-tier  banking  system  were
between  the National  Bank  and the Foreign  Trade  Bank  in  taken  by Hungary  and Poland  in 1987.  The essence  of the
each of the  countries?  Who  is funding  training  and technical  reforms  was enacted  in Poland  in 1989  when  the National
assistance  for the new debt managers?  What borrowing  Bank of Poland  (NBP)  was completely  separated  from its
instrumentsarebeingconsideredbysovereignsthatmay  still  commercial  banking  functions  and given a high  degree  of
have  access to the market  (Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  Ro-  autonomy.  As of January  1990  NBP  is no  longer  required  to
mania)?  Are  there  any pre-determined  borrowing  targets  by  submit a detailed  credit plan to Parliament  for approval.
currency?  What  is the institutional  forum  in  each  country  for  CSFR  initiatedbankingreformsin  1990,andtheratteris  still
developing  a national  strategy  to assist  private  enterprise  to  under  consideration  in Bulgaria  and  Romania.
gain  access  to foreign  financing?
The National  Bank  of Hungary  was until  recently  under
The answers to these questions  were pursued in the  the control  of the Council  of Ministers,  but legislation  es-
interviewswithcommercialbanks,andwturnedouttoberather tablishi.g  its independencewaspassed  in  December  1991.  A
inconclusive.  It  appears  that  the  National  Bank  of Hungary  is  main  role for the central  bank is to provide  finance  for the
the only  well-organized  entity  with  well-defined  staff  and  a  public  sector,  but the  new  law  limits  te credit hathNBH  must
strategy  to  access  the international  capital  markets,  and  that  provide  to  the public  sector.  Italso  requires  the  State  to  reduce
too  appears  heavily  dependent  upon  what  type  of  reception  is  its ownership  share  of commercial  banks  to 25% by 1997.
Since the introduction of two-tier banking in Hungary in
10 Vierna  Institute  of Comparative  Economic  Studies  report  of 9/91.
111987,  five independent  commercial  banks  were created  in  issue  was viewed  by the markets  as overt  demonstration  of
addition  to the  already  existing  specialized  smaller  financial  financial  support  for  Hungary  by the World  Bank. Subse-
institutions.  The three largest commercial  banks have a  quent to the ECO-enhanced  Eurobond, interbank lines
mark-et  share  of loans  outstanding  of about  two  thirds.  Fur-  were  re-established.  (Hungary  had  been  losing  significant
thermore,banks  with  foreignparticipationhavebeenpermnitted amounts  of short-term  interbank  deposits  in  early 1990).  A
tooperate  since  theearly  1980s.  The  numberofbanks  in  total  seven year Austrian  schilling  bond was launched  in Sep-
has  increased  to about  forty,  of which  one half  have  foreign  tember  1990,  and a five  year  DM  issue  came  out in  October
equity  participation.  The new Hungarian  ban dng law  fore-  1990.  Regular  bond  issues  havc  followed  in  DM,  ECU,  US
sees foreign  participation  to be limited  to 40% in the four  doLlars  and  yen. None  has  been  guaranteed  since  the ECO.
largest  banks.  A US$ I billion funding  program  was announced  for the
international  capital  markets  in 1991.
G. Access  to Bond Finance and other Private MLT
Financial  Flows  In May 1991 NBH set up the country's first Euro-
For new voluntary  capital flows,  (eg.  commercial  bank  medium  tern note  program. It is a relatively  small  facility
. . . .....  . . . ~~~~~~at  only DM200 millilon,  but It provides  a more flexible loans, bonds)  creditors  perceive  clear benefits  to waiting,  sr  on  f  digompared t bondes  The  program
unless  adequate  and  credible  assurances  are obtained  that  the  source  of funding  compared  to bond  Issues. The program
debt  will be serviced.  Czechoslovakia  and Hungary  are the  allows  for  paper to  be issued  as fixed  rate,  floating  rate  and only tw countrie  in the region  Ow have successfullyzero-coupon  notes with maturities from  two to thirty years.
onlyum  twon  counts  in  the markegionthat  he  end-198.  Aly  Paper  may  also  be issued  with  a  call  option. Deutsche  Bank medium  ter  tbonds  inthe markets  since  end-1989. Annex  is the arranger  and sole  dealer,  and says that  NBH is most
I lists  the two  countries'borrowings  since  1989.  likely to place the paper in Germany,  initially  within the
Hungary  has led the way in recent borrowings  by the  two  to four year maturity  range  due to investor  demand  at
region  in  the international  bond  markeL  Both Hungary  and  the short  end of the curve. NB  H intends  to  list the paper  on
CSFR compete  for funds with Latin American  borrowers  the Frankfurt  Stock  Exchange.
such as Mexico,  Venezuela,  Brazil,  Argentina  and to some
extentSouthAfrica.  MarketsourcessaythateastEriropean  The first EurodoUlar  issue was launched  in late June
states  attract  less  "flight  capital"  than  their  Latin American  1991  by Bankers  Trustasa five  yearUS$  100  milhion,l0.5%
counterparts.  This  has  some (limited)  effect  on the price  at  deal,  priced  at between  250  and  285  basis  points  over  the US
which  a new issue can be sold.  In other  words,  the spreads  Treasury  curve. According  to NBH officials, the major
paidby the  country  havetobehighersince  there  is noready  purpose  of the deal was to widen  Hungary's  funding  base
pool  of nationals,  well-informed  about the significance  of  and introduce  its name to investors'  portfolios. Moody's
reforms in the country, prepared  to buy its bonds. The  Investors  Services  rated NBH a Bal, while Japan Credit
country must therefore compete with other issuers of  Ratings  Agency  rated it A-.
similar  risk for a place in the foreign  investor's  portfolio.
Following  the Eurodollar issue, there was talk of an
The National  Bank of Hungary  (NBH)  was extremely  introduction  to the British  capital markets. The hope was
active in the international  capital  markets  in the first  nine  to raise  around  50  million  British  pounds  through  a sterling
months  of 1989,  borrowing  in  DM,  Yen,  Austrian  schillings  issue  (known  as a bulldog)  maturing  in  about  20  years,  with
and  ECU. Hungary  appears  to have  been  a great  favorite  of  a put option  after seven  years, for a yield spread  over the
the Yen private  placement  market  (known  as Shibosai)  in  seven year gilt as little as 'below three hundred basis
March 1989,  when Daiwa  Securities  anranged  six private  points". However, due to uncertainty  in the region in
placements  in the  same  month,  with  maturities  ranging  from  neighboring  Yugoslavia,  this introduction  has been post-
seven  toten  years  foramountsranging  fromYc20to40billion.  poned  for now. In the remainder  of 1991,  there  were four
more  bond  issues,  two  in yen  and  one  each  in DM  and  ECU.
The German  and Austrian  capital  markets  were  the first
to open their  doors to NBH  after  the changeover  in =tem  The largest  DM  bond to date for NBH has been issued
Europe at the end of 1989. As early as February  1990,  in January 1992, in the amount of DM600 million.  A
Hungary  issued a seven year bond in each market,  and  Samurai  bond  ofV30  billion  was  issued  in  the same  month,
returned  a second  time later  in the year.  not for private placement  but instead as a public issue,
representing  larger-scale  access by NBH to Japanese  in-
In August  1990  Hungary's  State  Development  Institute  vestors.
borrowed  US$200  million  at a fixed  coupon  rate  of 10.5%,
under the Expanded Cofinancing  Operations  (ECO) ar-  The risk  inherent  in  Hungary's  growing  liabilities  in the
rangement  whereby  repayment  of principal  was  backed  by  form  of  bonds  is  that  these  are  considered  the  most  inflexible
theWorldBank.  Thebondwasfortenyears,withrepayment  of debt,  held  by widely  scattered  small  retail  investors  who
of principal scheduled in the form of a bullet (single  aredifficulttofincd  Intheeventofdebtservicingdifficulties
installment)  repayment upon maturity. This first dollar  in future, Hungary  would have to accord seniority  to its
12bondholders.  Large  amounts  of IFI debt outstanding,  also  and may  be helpful  in  the effort to  understand  the  commer-
senior,  would  complicate  the picture.  cial bank/private  sector financing  attitudes towards the
region.  (See bibliography  for a  listing of IIF country
According  to the International  Financing  Review  of  reports).
March 21, 1992,  NBH is reportedly in discussion  with
Korean  banks  over  the possibility  of a new  syndicated  loan.
The amount  is likely to be US$40.60  million. Korea  and  Conclusion
Hungary  have strong  trade and investment  ties so for the
past couple of years NBH has headed to Seoul for its  Bankers  point  to a pattern  in the way emerging  econo-
international  tern loan borrowings. Last year, KDB ar-  mies attract  overseas  capital: privatization  of large scale
ranged  a US$40  million  loan  for NBH priced  at 150  basis  enterprises  is the first stage, attracting  both international
points  over  LIBOR  for seven  years. In 1990  its loan  only  equity  investment  and  project  finance  from  foreign  banks.
cost  87.5 basis  points  over  LIBOR  for four years,  with  the  This is followed  by the development  of a domestic  stock
spread falling to 75 basis points for the remaining  four  market, the sale of equity-linked  financial instruments
years.  abroad  and then,  finally,  wider  access to the intemational
debt markets.
CSFR,  while  on a far more  modest  scale  than  Hungary,
has also managed  to keep its name in the international
capital  markets  in 1990  and 1991.  The State  Bank  was  able
to borrow  US$200  million  in November  1991. The three
year  bonds  were  priced  to  yield  three  percent  more  than  US
government  securities  of comparable  maturity. This is a
higher price than that paid by Hungary  or Mexico,  but
cheaper  funding  than that  achieved  by Brazil  or Argentina.
In terms of financial ratios, CSFR is among the most
creditworthy  of borrowers.  Debt per capita stands at
US$506,comparedwithUS$1887  for Hungary.  However,
the  300  basis  point  yield  spread  overUS  governmentbonds
includes
(i)  the political  risk that intrna  divisions  within  the
country  might  lead to defau, e.g indepedence  of
Slovakia.  ForthisreasonthecovenantsoftheboWdissue
make  it a condition  of default  for  Statni  Banka  to  cease
toactasthecentral  bank  ofeitherthe  Slovak  orCzech
republics,  or the country  as a whole.  Nomura  Secu-
rities,  the lead  manager,  sates that  only  about  50  basis
points  of the  yield  spread  reflected  these  concerns;
(ii) the residual  risk  that  external  political  events  might
lead to damaging economic strain, e.g massive
influx  of economic  migrants  from Russia,  and
(iii) the unknown  economic  risks  of tansforming from
a conmmand  economy that was more centralized
than Hungary  or Poland  under  communist  rle.
CSFR  has  recognized,  in  common  with other  emerging
sovereign  borrowers  launching  bond issues in 1991  and
1992,  twat  the foundations  for wider  access to the capital
markets  can be laid  early in  the process  of adjustment,  even
if the process  of establishing  a track  record  requires  paying
premium  interest  rates at first.
Part II contains country-specific  information  on debt
and financial  flows  that  was  obtained  from  market  sources,
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HUNGARY  of 1990 amounted  to US$12.2  billion,  a decline  of about
US$1 billion  from the previous  year.  Debt to other  private
creditors  increased  to US$4.4  billion,  probably  reflecting
trade  credits  and  joint venture  working  baLances.  Commer-
Figure 18: Huncery  - Reletive Exuosure  bY  cial banks have clearly been Hungary's major source of
Creditor  - 1991  finance  in  the pasL  Their  exposure  is many  times  that  of all
other  creditors  put together.
21 .56X _  - %  19.60%  Total  external  debt fell to US$19.8  billion  at the end of
Julyl99  1,  of which  US$2billion  was  shortterm  and  US$17.8
6.87%  billion  was long  term debt. The fall in debt resulted  from
running  down  short  term  liabilities  and  a  strong  appreciation
of the dollar,  reducing  nondollar  liabilities  in dollar  terms.
External  reserves  are  reported  to  have  been  US$2.1  billion  at
. l  ~  the  end of August  1991  compared  with  US$  1.1  billion  at the
end of December  1990. Preliminary  figures  showed  an
increase  to US$2.7  billion  at the end of September,  repre-
I  I  M cwflaC  a  sentingthreemonthsof  imports.  Forallofl991,commercial
Fliurcel  a-  s  banks  are likely  to be repaid US$0.8  billion,  while other
Institutom  |  private  creditors  provide  US$0.6  billion.  On this  basis,  total
S~S~atf  bMWW. IIF  C.."  RW.%  debt at the end of 1991  would  be US$22.1  billion.  Debt to
commercial  banks, however,  would decline to US$11.6
billion  at the end  of 1991  from  US$12.6  billion  at the end  of
1990.  The  share  held  by commercial  banks  would  fall  to 52
Hungary's  total  extemal  debt  increased  to US$21.5  bil-  percentcomparedto59percentattheendof  1990.Inaddition
lion  at  theendof 1990  from  US$205  billionayearearlier.  A  to net credit  inflows  of US$1.3  billion,  the assumption  of a
positive  valuation  effect  of US$1.7  billion  more  than  offset  weaker  dolLar  accounts  for  the rise  in debt  from  its mid-year
netrepaymentsamountingtoaboutUS$600million.  Of  total  level  of US$19.8  billion.  Since  a large  share  of this  debt  is in
debt at the end  of 1990,  about  85% or US$185 billion  was  non-dollar  currencies,  its dollar equivalent  rises and falls
medium and long term. Short term commercial  debt de-  with the exchange  rate.
creased US$0.4  billion from the end of 1989 to US$2.9  In 1990  the pattern  of external  financing  changed  from
billion in 1990 mostly as a consequence  of outflows  to
commercialbanks.~~~~~  Toa.etoomrilbnsth  n  the paSt several years. Access to private international comrnercial banks. Total debt tocommercial  banks at the end
Table  6:  Breakdown  of External Financing  (in US$  million)
Convertible  Currency  17,106  19,752  19,681  20,537  21,481  22,145  21,649
Extemal  Debt of which
MLT  13,612  16,649  16,318  17,230  18,541  19,090  18,267
ST  3,494  3,103  3,363  3,307  2,940  3,055  3,382
By Creditor
IFIs  1,682  1,822  2,09S  2,108  2,833  4,340  5,200
Bilateral  1,684  2,145  1,864  1,767  1,656  1,522  1,281
Commercial  Banks  of which  12,095  13,625  13,086  13,269  12,642  11,510  10,146
MLT  9,059  11,031  10,264  10,574  10,981  9,893  8,419
ST  3,036  2,594  2,822  2,695  1,661  1,618  1,727
Other Private  Creditors  1,645  2,161  2,633  3,393  4,350  4,774  5,021
Reserves  Excluding Gold  2,302  1,634  1,467  1,246  1,069  2,945  3,902
Depositsin BIS Banks  2,141  1,504  1,379  1,165  1,764  - -
14capital markets was reduced,  and Hungary  drew on re-  Factors  Influencing  Foreign  Involvement  in the Economy.
serves to meet net repayments  of about US$1 billion to  Size of Private  Sector
private creditors.  A relatively strong current account  On the output side, recorded  industrial  production  of
performance  in  1991 has limited Hungary's financing  enthe  wit  more  ded  industriacpountin  or
needs  to amortization  payments  and reserve  accumulation.  enterprises  with more thean  50 employees,  accounting  for
Ineaddition,  DI  flowsincreased  strongly  toaalmostUS$400  80  percent  of output,  fell  9 percent  in 1990.  In 1991,  output
million  for  January through  May 1991.  of enterprises  employing  more  than  300  people decreased
by 20%. At the same time, an expansion  of over 50%
In the first eleven  months  of 1991,  Hungary's  external  occurred  in theoutputofprimarily  private  small  businesses
financing  situation strengthened  through  better than ex-  employing less than 50 persons. Large enterprises, in
pected  current  account  performance,  higher  foreign  direct  particular,  showed less flexibility in shifting  production
investment  inflows  and large inflows  from official  credl-  into  exports  to western  markets.  Production  of small  enter-
tors. As a result, access to international  capital markets  prises is reported  to have officially  doubled,  reducing  the
increased.  Foreign  direct  investment  amounted  to  US$750  fall in total  production  somewhaL
million  by the  end  of September  1991  compared  to  US$337
million  for the whole  of 1990.  Reorientation  of Trade
No major new medium-term  bank credits were an-  Exports to the CMEA region amounted to US$630
nounced in 1991,  as banks  continued  to receive  net pay-  million  plus TR500m  which  is substantially  less  than the
ments,  implying  a reduction  in their  exposure.  A US$  100  TR2.6 billion registered in the first half of 1990. The
million  bond issue was placed  in the European  market  by  reorientation  of Hungarian  foreign  trade  continues:  in the
Bankers  Trust  in July 1991,  carrying  a coupon  rate  of 300  first six months  of 1991 about 73% of exports  were des-
basis points over LIBOR.  Bond issues announced  in the  tined  for  the OECD  region,  of which  47% were for  the EC.
sterling  market  were  postponed,  however,  as the political  Exports  to Germany  increased  by 58%, and imports  from
situation  in neighboring  Yugoslavia  contributed  to uncer-  there by 71%. (Only some 10% of trade with Germany
tainty in the market.  There were also three DM bonds in  corresponds  to  former  GDR  territory).  The volume  of trade
March,  April  and October 1991.  The first two  were  issued  with  Germany  may  reach  some  US$4  billion  by end 1991.
each with  a five year  maturity,  in the amounts  of DM  200  In convertible  currency  trade with the Soviet Union,
million  and DM 150  million.  The October 1991  DM  bond  Hungarian  deliveries  amounted to US$400 million,  and
maturesinseven  years.  HungaryalsotappedtheEuromarket  imports to US$675 million in the first eight months of
in October 1991  with an issue  of ECU 200 million  and a  1991.
Yen issue of 20 billion.  The ECU issue matures  in five
years, and the Samurai  in seven years.  Two more bonds  Despite  real appreciation  of the forint,  exports  to  West-
have  been  issued  subsequently  in 1992:  a Samurai  bond  of  ern markets increased  strongly. In November 1991 the
30 bilion yen and a DM600  million  bond. (See  Annex 1  Government  devalued  the forint by about 5% in order  to
for a summary  of Hungary's  access to bond markets).  strengthen  competitiveness.
Table7showsthat1989wasthelastyeainwhichcommercial  The situation  is unbalanced  with  regard  to  trade-related
banksmadeapositivenettransfertoHungary.Nonewshrntefn  payments; while Hungary reportedly transfers the pay-
caedits  have  been  reclrded  either.  On the  other  hand,  positive  ments for imported  goods without  delay, the USSR  had
inflows  are still  coming  fromn  oter pivate ceitors.  opened  letters  of credit  amounting  to  only  US$163  million
by the end  of July. In effect,  therefore,  Hungary  is extend-
Table 7: Hungary:  External Financing Flows (in US$ million)
1989  1990  1991  1992
External Borrowing,  Net  1,268  -646  1,340  350
of which
Commercial  Banks  529  -1,670  -750  -935
Disbursements  1,866  1,015  700  550
Repayments  -1,280  -1,485  -1,450  -1,665
ST credits,  net  -56  -1,200  0  180
Other Private  Creditors,  Net  818  677  550  443
Disbrrsements  1,000  382  750  600
Repayments  -224  -260  -310  -358
ST Credits,  Net  42  555  110  200
Source: IIF,Country  Report  dated  November  8, 1991
15ing involuntary  trade  credits to that country.  The Hungar-  CZECHOSLOVAKIA
ian  government  has  also  signed  agreements  with  individual
republics.  These  include  mutual  deliveries  of  commodities  Figure  19: Czechoslovrkle:  RelotIve  Exposure  by
with  Russia  of up to US$670  million,  US$50  million  with  Creditor 1991
the Ukraine and US$300 million with Kazakhstan  for
1991. Performance  on these agreements  remains to be  . E  21.4S%
seen.  20.34%
Other
Tourism produced 20% higher convertible  currency
income  than  in  theperiodJanuary-May  1990  despitea  12%
decrease in the number of visitors. There has been a
substantial  inflow  of convertible  currency  in the form of
unilateral  transfers  from  abroad  for private  individuals.  In  x
the first quarter  of 1991  this amounted  to  US$200  million.
It is assumed  that some  of these  transfers  represent  export
incomes  of private entrepreneurs  who underinvoice  their  13  int  o  G Carwcis  U OfdI  0  otw PrrvOte
export deliveries  and who  later get part of  their export
receipts from western partners in this form. This reduces
their corporate tax and personal income tax liabilities.
Convertible  currency  deposits  of the  population  at Hungar-  Gross  convertible  currency  debt  of US$8.1  billion  at the
ian  banks  doubled  within  ayearandreachedUS$1.3  billion  end of 1990  was little  changed  from the end-1989  total  of
at the end of June 1991.  US$8.2  billion  although  substantial  movements  in  the debt
Hungary's  approach to privatization  is to sellenter-  position  took  place during  the year.  The debt declined to
prises to investors  rather than distributing  them to the  US$7.0  billion  at the end of June as the payments  difficul-
population via a voucher  tha  r  them  toztie  ties of Bulgaria  and the USSR  in early 1990 led western
scheme.  viMe  pavatization of small businesses  and the  banks  to withdraw  short  term  deposits  from  CEE  countries, seheme.ivathepivatio  ation  cofpasmais  busceinessesctess  including  CSFR.  In addition,  importers  preferred  to  pay in self-privatization  of companies is proceedimg  success-
fully  and on track. A setback  with  one large,  visible  deal,  cash  rather  than  use  or renew  trade  credits,  oreven  prepay
thedelayof  thesaleofa state-ownedhotelchain,illusrates  in anticipation  ofthepreannounceddevaluation.  The total
some of the complexities that may arise in parficular  convertiblecurrencydebtincreasedtoUS$8.8billionatthe
cases.  The sale  exites  arise  in priua  end of June 1991  from US$8.1  billion  at the end of 1990.
tax breaks  allowing  enterprises  to offset  rme  cost of con-  Large,  medium  and  long  tenn disbursements  from  official
sta  o  bak  caling  etprisenst  Mofet  the  os  o  Bon-  creditors  were  partially  offset  by valuation  effects  from  the struction  and capital improvements.  Mhoreover,  thle  lNB  appreciation  of the dollar.  Short term debt in contrast,
has  insisted  that  the new  ownerof  thechain  mustrefinance  cntin  o  dle  in19. The  terBn  repts  that
subsidized loans obtained in the mid-1980s  to finance  tisue  o  de  i  Ts staie  ink  reports  that
construction  at  market  rates.  ~the  Issuance of  trade credits stabilized  in  1991 after  it construction  at mnarket  rates. declined steadily in 1990.  Still, some Western banks
continue  to withdraw  short term deposits.
Table 8: CSFR External Debt  (in US$  million)
I  ~~~~198  1=  198  I98  I99  199  1(e)  1222(f!
Convertible  Currency  5,568  6,656  7,281  8,183  8,085  9,251  9,827
External Debt of which
MLT  2,877  3,580  3.875  4,596  5,180  6,.808  7,444
ST  2,691  3,076  3,406  3,587  2,905  2,443  2,383
By Creditor
IFIs  27  131  136  134  135  1,984  2,683
Bilateral  1,513  1,876  1,454  1,701  1,576  1,882  2,062
Commercial  Banks  of which  3,114  3,927  4,786  5,648  5,349  4,640  4,229
MLT  1,202  1,456  2,164  2,795  3,120  2,738  2,440
ST  1,912  2,471  2,622  2,853  2,228  1,902  1,789
Other Private  Creditors  914  722  905  701  1,025  745  853
Reserves  ExcL  Gold  1,115  1,382  1,583  2,157  1,102  2,673  3,929
Deposits  in BIS Banks  1.217  1,598  1,671  2,197  1,353  - -
Source: HF,  Country  Report  dated  November  22, 1991
16Again,  by  creditorcategory  the commercial  banks  have  Following a  small negative ransfer to commercial
the largest exposure.  Within  the commercial  claims,  it is  banksin 1990,therewasanetinflowofUS$182millionin
surprising  that  up to 1989  a larger  amount  is ST  thanMLT.  1991,  and this  trend  is expected  to continue,  although  in a
This pattern  does not hold  when the overall  hard  currency  smaller  amount  for 1992.  Inflows  from  other  private  credi-
indebtedness  is taken into account.  tors jumped in  1990,  dropped sharply in 1991 and are
expected  to rise again in 1992.
Debt increased  again in the second  half of 1990  as a
result of net new medium and long tern borrowing  plus  Funds  in 1990  were  raised  primarily  by two  bond  issues
substantial  valuation  effects.  Short  term  debt continued  to  in  Germany  (each  DM  350  million)  plusa  private  placement
decrease  throughout  the second half of 1990 in spite of  in  Japan  at the end  of the year  (Y  5  billion).  These  funds  are
administrative  measures  introduced  in  October  to restrict  assumed by market experts to have come equally from
cash payments  for  imports and encourage the use of  commercial  banks  and other  private investors.  Joint ven-
customary  trade credits.  By the end of 1990,  short term  tures raised most of the remaining  net MLT financing,
debt had  fallen  to  US$2.9  billion,  or less  than  36 percent  of  much of it guaranteed  by western  export credit agencies.
total debt, compared to US$3.6 billion,  or more than 45  The State  Bank  reports  that  the net short  term outflow  was
percent  of total debt at the end of 1989.  accounted  for in roughly  equal  parts by the withdrawal  of
short  termn  deposits  and  by the net repayment  of short  term
The 1989  swing  of the  convertible  currency  account  into  trade  credits.
deficit  was  largely  finai.ced  by a  US$  1.1  billion  drawdown
of reserves.  Net external borrowing  totaled  just US$0.3  The State  Bank was expecting  to issue a bond in mid-
billion  as net new MLT borrowing  was largely  offset  by  1991  if marketconditions  werepropitious  and  if  they  could
US$0.6 billion in net short-term  repayments.  In the first  beconfidentofapositivereception.ThiswouldbetheState
half of 1991,theconvertible  currency  tradebalance  moved  Bank's first issue on its own after guaranteeing  the two
into deficit by about US$500 million,  compared with a  bond issues  by Obchodni  Banka in 1990.  The State Bank
suwplus  of  almost  US$50  million  in 1990.  The  deterioration  finally  ventured  into  the private  capital  market  at thewid  of
was  due to  the transfer  of most  payments  for  Soviet  oil  onto  October  1991  with  a US$200  million  three  year  bond.  The
a convertible  currency  basis. The underlying  growth of  issue was in fact very well received.  The State Bank of
nonoil imports and exports was roughly balanced. The  Czechoslovakia  also issuedY10billion  of six yearprivate
value of convertible  currency  imports soared  almost 50  placement  bonds in  November  1991.  In addition,  the State
percent  to  US$4.1  billion  in  the first  half  of 1991  compared  Bank  authorized  more  than  20 Czechoslovak  companies  to
to a year ago, reflecting both payments of US$80-100  borrow  US$120  millionabroadin 1991.  Another  Samurai
millionamonthforSovietoilaswellasimpoxtliberalization.  issue in dollars, in the amount of US$200 million was
First half exports  rose almost 30 percent compared  to the  arranged  by Nomura  Securities  with  a three year  maturity,
first half of 1990  to a dollar  value  of US$3.5  bilion. The  in December  1991. (See Annex 1 for a summary  of bond
increase  is attributable  to  some  redirection  of exports  from  issues  since 1990).
eastern to western markets and to higher EC quotas for
some products  such as textiles.  Itisestimated  that  official  bilateral  creditorsprovidedin
net somewhat  over  US$300  million,  and that  other  private
Financing  in 1991  came largely  from official  creditors  creditors  provided  almostUS$60  million  net. Commercial
for the first time.  banks  appear to have  received net repayments  of almost
US$100  million  in 1990.
Table  9: CSFR External Financing  Flows
(in US$  million)  The use of trade credits was expected to increase in
1982  1Q  1221  12  1991,  largely  due to payments  restrictions  introduced  in
October  1990  to  force  importers  to  take  up customnary  trade
External Borrowing,  Net  553  315  1,699  1,050  finacing.
of which
Commercial  Banks  469  -271  -364  -17i  More  unguaranteed  trade  financing,  plus the State  Bank
Disbursements  493  467  170  285  bond issue, could bring net financing  of almost US$200
Repayments  428  -315  -384  461  million  fron commercial  banks and almost US$100  mil-
ST Credits,  net  -21  423  -150  0  lion  from other  private  creditors.  In addition,  direct  invest-
Other Private  Creditors,  Net  0  221  -201  167  ment  flows are up sharply and may total  US$450  million
Disbursements  340  480  147  266  for 1991,  much  of it accounted  for by the VW investment
Repayments  -269  -189  -398  -139  in Skoda Auto. The capitalization  of newly permitted
ST Credits,  Net  -71  -70  50  40  foreign bank operations accounted for another US$30
million. The combination of substantial direct foreign
Source: HF,  Country Report  dated  November  22,1991  investment  inflows,  large disbursements  of official  credits
17and the better  than expected  current  account  performance  A list  of 2500  companies  has been  published,  including
have  allowed  the authorities  to replenish  foreign  exchange  information  about  the amount  and  nominal  value  of shares
reserves  from the end-1990  level of US$1.1  billion.  Re-  tobe offered  for vouchers.  The portion  of these  companies
serves  increasedtoUS$1.6billion  atend-June  1991  and  to  to be privatized by voucher is reported to average 30
about US$2.2  billion  at end-September.  percent. The price of the companies'  shares  is defined  in
voucher  units,  so-called  "investment  points". The process
Total convertible  currency  extemal debt increased  to  iorward  'i  to  waves,mea  oich  prone
US$9.3  billion  by the end of 199  1.  This  represents  a sharp  is to go forward  in  two  waves,  each  of which  cornprise  one
increase from US$8by  billion at end-1990e  but is stihr  list  of state-owned  companies  for  sale against  one batch  of
icmareas  from U$.1  bLlion at.end-l1990,ebut  iss  vouchers  issued. Within  each wave, there  will be several
comparatively  low. Large medium and long-term dis-  ronsdsge  omthspl  n  eadfra
bursements  from official  creditors  were partially  offset  by  . .
valuation  effects  from  the appreciation  of the dollar.  Short-  equilibrium  price in terms of investment  points.
term debt,  in contrast,  has  continued  to decline.  The State  In  the firstround,aprice  is moreorless  setarbtrarilyby
Bank  reports  that  the use  of trade  credits  stabilized  in 1991  the government.  If there  is an excess  supply  of investment
after declining  steadily  in 1990.  However,  some western  points  at that  price,  no shares  will  be sold  and  the price will
banks appear to have continued  to withdraw  short-term  be raised  in the next round. Each  round  is expected  to last
deposits  in the face  of heightened  uncertainty  in the  region.  no longer than  a month and one privatization  wave is not
Amortization  payments  rose  from  US$800  million  in 1990  expected  to have  more  than five rounds. If fewer invest-
to  US$1.1  billion  in 1991.  However,  the debt service  ratio  ment points are offered at  the first round than shares
may not rise sharply if higher payments are offset by  available for sale, all orders are filled and the unsold
increased  exports  to  the west,  and  by  the gradual  transfer  of  remainder  is offered  at a lower  price in the next round.
previously nonconvertible  exports to a convertible  cur-  The voucher  program  has made  specific  allowance  for
rency basis.  mutual  funds,  known  as Investment  Privatization  Funds.  A
"pre-round"  period has been  set aside, during  which  indi-
vidual  owners  can sign over their registered vouchers  to
Factore  E  Ionomuencingy  Greater  Foreign Involvementin  one  of the many  such funds  in  return  for shares  in  the fund.
the Economy  These funds are likely to be attractive,  given the limited
Size of Private Sector  information  available  about the companies. The govern-
Private  s.tor  employment  has  grown,  but is still  below  ment  has made  substantial  efforts  to publicize  and explain Private  sector  employment  has  grown,  but Is  still  below  voceprga.Plinrystaesndaedht
10 percent of employment  in the state and cooperative  ItS voucher  program. Preldmto  ary estlmates  itdocated  that
sectos. Pivatzatin  ha  beendivied  ito  to  stges.  fewer  citizens  planned  to  take part,  relative  to the4 million sectors.  Privatization  has been divided  into two stages.  th  goenmn  exetd  rmto  fot  aebe
The so called "small"  privatization  encompasses  restau-  the govemment  expected. Promotion  effons have been
rants,  services  and  other  locally  controled businesses.  The  intensified,  andas of  May 1991  it was  reported  that  as many
"small"  privatization  began  in  late  January 1991.  As  of the  as 8.6  millon people  were  involved.  The main  difficulty  is
end  of the  third.quarter  of 199110002establishmen  that very little information  is available  on the fmancial end of the thilr quarter  of 1991,  10,wz2  establishments  m  condition  of th  companies  on the voucher privatization
the Czech  republic  and 5,044  in Slovakia  had  been sold at  f  ieston  te  vll  aizim  f
auction. This  represents  between  10  and 15  percent  of the  and  may  produce  false  expectations.  With  solid  tnforma-
establislunents  to be included  in  the 'small' privatizton.  anmyprdcflsexctio.Wthoidnona
tion at such a high  premium  in entire  process,  safeguards
The groundwork  is also being laid for the so-called  against insider  deals of many conceivable  kinds will be
"large"  privatization  program. In the spring  of 1991  each  difficult to implement.
of the large enterprises involved began preparing a
"privatization  project" to be presented  to the government  Reorientation  of Trade
by October  31 1991.  These projects  include  an inventory,
a valuation  and a proposal  for  privatizing  the company  by  The commodity  composition  of CMEA  trade differed
any of the approved  methods: limited block auctions  to  greatly from the pattern of trade with the west. Thus,
foreign  interests, issuing  shares  through  domestic  or for-  redirecting  trade  depends  on structural  change  and not  just
eign flotations,  preferential  share distribution  to employ-  greater  marketing  efforts. In 1990  about one-half  of the
ees,  or the issue  of domestic  investment  vouchers.  Voucher  doUlar  value  of total  trade  was  with  the west,  up from  about
coupon  booklets  havebeen  available  sinceOctober  1,1991  one-third in 1985. However, most of this change was
at any post office to anyone  for about US$1 equivalent.  causedbyadeclineinCMEAtradein 1990,  rather han  by
Citizens  older  than 18  can register  their  vouchers  for a fee  a successful  redirection  from  east to  west.  In the absence  of
of about US$33  equivalent,  a little more than one week's  such redirection,  the loss of the Soviet market  is having  a
average wage, and use them as a means of payment  for  major  impact  on production  and employment.
shares  of government  owned enterprises  which  have been  Industrial  production  declined  3.9 percent  in 1990  fol-
converted  to joint stock companies.  lowing  modest  growth  of 0.9  percent  in 1989.  On the other
18hand, official statistics  probably  overstate  the decline  in  POLAND
production  since  they  give  insufficient  weight  to  small  new
firms. (At  the beginning  of 1991  the index  was broadened
to include  enterprises  employing  25 or more  persons  from  Piouro  20: Polnd  - 1ExDoure  bv Creditor
the previous  minimum  of 100).  Also,  a 30 percent  decline
in real  private  conswnption  i n 1991 has  been  estimated  by  3.70%  1 0  1  6%
the Federal  Statistical  Office,  but this  is probably  an over-  23.06X
statement since consumers  stockpiled  goods in 1990 in
anticipation  of the price liberalization.
CSFR  has  taken  the lead in  negotiating  new agreements
to revive nonconvertible  trade. This is in response  to a
shortage of convertible  currencies  in the former USSR,  .07x
which  prevents  the  orderly  settlement  of  past  imbalances  in
hard currency according to the agreement  under which
CMEA  was  dismantled  in  January 1991.  Early  in 1991,an  M n&tnwi  w1cUal  cwwci  E o0w  Pr pate
agreement  was signed  with  the  USSR  providing  for  mutual  FIIt"  ON*.
trade (excluding  energy)  equal  to about 30 percent of the
1990  level. Subsequent  arrangements  have  focused  on  C-" RK
bilateral  deals with  individual  republics  and producers.
In February 1990,  Paris Club creditors  agreed to re-
schedule  100  percent  of principal  and interest  arrears  due
through March 1991. This agreement  in large measure
The two new commercial  banks extended  less credit  contributed  to net official bilateral financing  of US$2.4
than  was allowed  under  the restrictive  credit  ceilings  in  the  billion  in 1990.  Disbursements  of new  credits  amounted  to
first quarter  of 1991.  This seems  to have  been largely  due  US$215 million  cnly. Repayments  of less than US$100
to their reluctance to extend any new credits to state  million  were made  to the US commodity  Credit  Corpora-
enterprises  whose  continued  existence  is uncertain,  and to  tion on loans  not covered  by the Paris  Club rescheduling.
new private  entrepreneurs  in the absence  of a bankruptcy
law.  Following  protests  by state enterprises  about the lack  Negttion  t  commeril  bn  remainedad-
o crd.  aviaii.  the.  Stt  BakrlxdsIghl  h  ocked  throughout  1990,  and resulted  in the accumulation of credit availability,  the State Bank relaxed slightly the  ofU13bLlnintalfersocmecalaksy
regulationsgoverning  borrowing  abroad.  Companies  were  of US$1.3 billion  in total  arrears to  commercial  banks  by regculagei to make full use of normal trade-related  for-  May 1991. Negotiations  continued to be protracted in
encouraged  . 1991,  and further  interest  arrears  of US$850  million  were
eign credits. In addition they may now take up foreign  accumulated  in  the course  of the year.  The  short-term  trade
credits,  with  the.pemission  of the State  Bankonacaseby  facilities  with commercial  banks were serviced and re-
case  basis.  In addition,  at least  two  foreign  banks  have  been  mained  available.
granted  licenses  to do full banking  business  in CSFR.
For the entire year of 1991, Poland is likely to have
received  aboutUS$1  billion  in new  medium  and  long-term
disbursements  mostly  from international  financial  institu-
tions  and official  bilateral  creditors.  The new credits  com-
bined with the rescheduling  of interest due in the first
quarter to the Paris  Club and the accumulation  of interest
arrears to commercial  banks resulted  in total net external
borrowing  of US$2.1  billion  in 1991.  This  more  than  offset
the current account deficit of US$1.9 billion (after Paris
Club interest payment  reduction).  No new lending from
commercial  banks is foreseen  prior to an agreement.
The tiny proportion  of short term debt both in overall
debtandincommercialdebtalone,evenas  farbackas 1986
is remarkable,  given  the situation  in CSFR,  a neighbor.  In
fact,  the table  shows  that  in  all years  except  1989,  theentire
ST obligations  were owed to commercial  banks. Other
private  creditors  have  experienced  no debt servicing  prob-
lems.
19Table 10: Poland:  External Debt (in US$  million)
Convertible  Currency  33,528  39,249  39,165  41,387  49,019  50,780  50,700
External  Debt of which
MLT  30,593  37,749  37,133  37,061  46,625  47,676  46,891
ST  1,392  1,500  1,450  1,295  1,339  1,384  1,302
By Creditor
IFIs  2,641  2,815  2,614  2,631  3,288  3,976  5,162
Bilateral  20,337  24,901  25,862  28,634  33,385  33,612  32,190
Commercial  Banks  of which  8,617  9,529  8,856  8,580  10,627  11,438  11,767
MLT  7,225  8,029  7,406  7,360  8,386  8,335  7,958
ST  1,392  1,500  1,450  1,080  1,339  1,384  1,302
Interest  Arrears  0  0  0  140  901  1.720  2,507
Other Private  Creditors  1,933  2,004  1,833  1,542  1,720  1,753  1,581
Interest  Arrears  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Reserves  excl. Gold  698  1,495  2,055  2,314  4,492  3,968  4,069
Deposits  in BIS Banks  1,721  2,995  3,619  3,929  7,762  - -
Source:  IIF, Country  Report,  dated  November  3. 1991
For all of 1990,  the combination of a Paris Club resched-  Factors  lWuencingForeign lnvolvementin  the Economy
uling,  the accumulation  of interest  arrears  and new credits  Inpact of Private  Sector
permitted Poland to accunulate total foreign exchange
assets  of US$5.5  billion.  Approximately  US$2.2  billion  of  The decline of industrial  production  has been broad-
this was recorded  as an increase  in official  reserves,  with  based. Output in the machine building and metallurgy
the remainder  being deposited  by Polish  banks  with  banks  sectors  was hardest  hit, while  production  in food  process-
abroad.  This  should  give Polish  banks  the ability  to  gener-  ing and  wood/paper  sectors  showed  strong  growth  reflect-
ate trade "credits" on a fully covered basis. In fact, it is  ing in part an increase of exports to western countries.
reported by a reliable source in the market that Polish  Growth  of output in the private  sector has been buoyant,
commercial  banksarebecoming  heavily  involved  in  project  although  measurement  problems  make  it difficult  to quan-
fnance and commodity  fmancing  in  Poland. A number  of  tify.
them are involved  in  channelling  (small  amounts  of) hard  Government  hopes for speeding  up the privatization
currency  credits to the emerging  private  sector.  process rest mostly on the implementation  of a scheme
involving  the issuance  of vouchers  to the public.  Holders Table)): Pohlnd's  External iancig  Flows  will  deposit  the vouchers  with  investment  funds  which  will
(in US$  milion)  use  them  to  bid for shares  at auctions.  In this  way,  investor
19  1991(e) 1922(f)  riskistobereduced.Thegovemmentalsohopestoaccelerate
External  Financing,  Net  3,885  2,135  2,490  privatization  through a substantial  relaxation  of existing
of which  legislation which requires the approval of the Foreign
Investment  Agency  for  a foreign  equity  stake  of more  than
Commercial  Banks  796  850  855  10  percent.
Disbursements  0  0  0  Despite more than 3000 joint ventures with foreign
Repayments  0  0  0  partners  having  been approved,  foreign  direct investment
Due  0  -345  -160  has remained insignificant so far. The uncertain political
Rescheduled/Postponed  0  345  160  situation  combined  with  continued  confusion  about  prop-
ST Credits,  Net  0  0  0  erty laws has dampened  the confidence  of foreign  inves-
Interest  Arrears  796  850  855  tars.  A revised  Foreign  Investment  Act  came into  effect in
July 1991, which eliminates the minimum investment Other  Private  Creditors,  Net  103  40  -115  amount,  guarantees  the repatriation  of 100  percent after-
Source: HF,  Country  Report,  dated  November  3. 1991  tax profits and guarantees compensation  for all losses
resulting  from expatriation.
20Reorientation  of Trade
The severe contraction  in domestic  demand  led enter-  BULGARIA
prises  to seek  external  markets  both  in the  westand  in  the  FiCur  21: Bulgerle - Rl1tive  ExDosuro  bY
CMEA area. The value of convertible  currency  exports
jumped about 43% in 1990 and in volume terms nearly  6  13  1%
49%.  Alargepartof the increasewas  with  France,  Italy  and
Gernany. Imports  in the final quarter  of 1990  represented  1  9.04%
46% of the total  imports  for  the year,  and were  nearly  90%
higher than in the corresponding  quarter of 1989. Oil
imports  in  convertible  currency  were  substituted  for deliv-
ery shortfallsfromthe  SovietUnion,butshipmentsofother
goods were also accelerated  because of concern over a
possible  devaluation  of the zloty.  Nonconvertible  currency
import volume  declined  more than  30 percenL  0 1anteumal  W  Cfldd  S  cmial  0  Oa  Pr  vato
In December 1991, Poland signed an association  FZZU
agreement  with  the European  Community,  effective  as of  ,,,
January 1, 1992. The accord  foresees  the gradual  phasing
out of cusoms  barriers  on tade in  industrial  goods  over  the  Throughout  1990  there  was a severe  shortage  of foreign
next seven years. Starting in 1992,  Poland  will remove  exchange  at the disposal of the government. This was
customs duties on goods making up 27% of its imports  further  exacerbated  by the suspension  of trade fiacing
from the EC which  in turn  will  remove  duties  on 64%  of its  from  western  creditors,  and imports  fell even  more  sharply
imports  from Poland. The agreement  leaves removal  of  than exnorts.  The value of convertible  currency  imports
farm trade barriers  to further talks, but the Polish Gov-  was  24  percent  lower  in 1990  than  in 1989.  The convertible
emnment  was  able to negotiate  cuts  in  custom  dues  on more  currency  trade  deficit therefore  narrowed  to US$800  mil-
than half of the value  of food  expors to the EC.  lion in 1990,  from US$1.2 billion in 1989.  At the same
time, about US$900  million  in interest  payments  (includ-
ing interest  on rolled  over maturities)  were due, of which
some US$300 million were paid before the June 1990
moratorium.  The reduction  in the trade deficit  was  almost
offset by the increase  in the invisibles  deficit,  and so the
overallconvertible  currencycurrentaccountbalanceposted
a deficit  of US$1.25  bilion, very slightly  smaller  than  the
US$1.3  billion  deficit in 1989.
External  financing  came to  a virtual  halt after  the June
moratorium.  Practically  no new money  came from  former
multilateral  creditors.  Principal  and interest  payments  to
both official bilateral  creditors  and to commercial  banks
ran into arrears.  Of the estimated  US$360  million  in prin-
cipal due  to  official  bilateral  creditors,  only  US$70  million
were paid. About  US$80 million  in interest  arrears  were
accumulated.  An estimated US$1 billion was owed to
commercial  banks, of which some US$270  million  were
paid. Almost  US$280  million  accumulated  in interest  ar-
rears.
Debt repayments  by developing  countries to Bulgaria
amounted  to about US$200  million  in 1990,  but there  was
also an outflow  of about US$300  million  from Bulgrian
commercial  banks  and enterprises  as they increased  their
assets  abroad.
The difficult external  financial  situadon  and the large
current  account  deficit led to a rapid depletion  of official
foreign exchange  reserves.  According  to the authorities,
official  reserves  (excluding  gold)  fell  from US$1  billion  at
end-1989  to less  than  US$140  million  at the end of March
1990,  with  little change  until the end of 1990.
21Table  12: Bulgaria's External Debt (in US$  million)
12i:  1  2  IM  I  1920(e)  19220  1922(Q
Convertible  Currency  5,218  7.081  8,889  10,224  11,030  12,122  13,374
External  Debt
of which  MLT  3,695  5,070  6,475  7,520  7,402  7,864  8,415
ST  1,523  2,011  2,414  2,704  3,272  3,125  3,054
Interest  Arrears  0  0  0  0  357  1,133  1,905
By Creditor
IFIs  310  490  700  660  752  1,517  2,150
Bilateral  1,519  1,620  1,703  1,238  1,063  1,169  1,380
Commercial  Banks  3,362  4,599  6,111  7,256  8,223  8,626  9,071
of which  MLT  2,146  2,978  4,178  4,924  5,057  4,886  4,752
ST  1,216  1,621  1,933  2,332  2,881  2,775  2,663
Interest  Arrears  0  0  0  0  285  965  1,656
Other  Private  Creditors  27  372  375  1,070  993  810  773
Interest  Arrears  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Reserves  excl. Gold  1,182  850  1,462  1,013  125  544  757
Deposits  in BIS Banks  1,381  1,085  1,780  1,176  653  - -
Source: IIF, Country  Report,  dated  November  19, 1991
However,  deposits in BIS-reporning  banks throughout  foreign  exchange  earnings  kept  abroad  by Bulgarian  enter-
1990 amounted to about US$630 million at the end of  prises  reluctant  to surrender  earnings  to the authorities.
March,  US$570  million  at the end of June, and US$590  No new commercial  lending  is foreseen  until the gov-
million  at the end of September.  The difference  between  emment is ready to assume responsibility  for the debt
Bulgarian  BIS deposits  and official  reserves  might  reflect  outstanding.
Table 13: Bulgaria's External Financing Flows  (in US$ million)
1987  18  I292  1990  21  1222(f)
External  Borrowing,  Net  1,009  2,181  1,299  202  1,450  1,590
of which
Commercial  Banks  530  1,501  1,114  497  685  700
Disbursements  916  1,260  2,363  212  0  0
Repayments  -282  416  -1,637  -383  0  0
Due  -282  -416  -1,637  -2,033  -1,030  -663
Rescheduled/Postponed  0  1,650  1,030  663
ST Credits,  Net  -103  657  388  374  0  0
Interest  Arrears  0  0  0  294  685  700
Other Private  Creditors  296  146  675  -140  -150  -15
Disbursements  53  140  669  213  10  40
Repayments  -33  -87  -342  -152  -58
Due  -33  -87  -342  -152  -58
Rescheduled/Postponed  0  0  0  0  0  0
ST Credits,  Net  243  39  93  -12  -8  -3
Interest  Arrears  0  0  0  0  0  0
Source: HF,  Country  Report,  dated November  19, 1991
22ROMANIA  demand.  Imports  of consumer  goods  jumped  by more  than
600  percent,  and  imports  of raw  materials  also  rose  sharply.
2  reditor - 1991  The dollar  value of  total  convertible  currency  imports
increased  by more than 50 percent from 1989  to 1990,  to
US$5.1 billion. At the same time, the dollar value of
28.59  37.38%  convertible  currency  exports  fell by 42 percent  to US$3.5
37.38%  billion.
The deterioration  of the convertible  currency  current
account  balance  was in  part precipitated  by the Gulf  crisis.
lT z  dollar  value  of net oil imports  increased  from US$250
l 5.92  , |  ,  _  million  in  1989  toalmostUS$  1.1  billion  in 1990.  (Romania
GTR1  %  is an oil producing  country).
The convertible  currency current account deficit of
US$1.7  billion was financed  almost entirely  by drawing
down reserves.  Official reserves  (excluding  gold) fell  by
13  lIternatnal  ;  aOfkil  Ur  Ccial  oE3  Or  Prnivte  US$1.6  billion  in 1990  from US$1.9  billion  at the end of
FeianeIl  elaal  Bark  1989.  No financing  was provided  by multilateral  financial
__st_  __i__  institutions  in  1990.  About  US$40  million  came  from
official  bilateral  creditors,  while some  US$100  million  of
short  tern trade  credits were  repaid  to commercial  banks.
The external  balance  of payments  deteriorated  sharply  The total net outflow  to external creditors  seems to have
in 1990asproductiondeclinedandconsumptionincreased.  been about US$50  million.
The convertible  currency current account swung into a  Total  external  debt  was  aboutUS$500  million  at the end
deficit  of US$1.7  billion  from  a surplus  of US$2.6  billion  of 1990,  little changed  from 1989.  Most of the debt con-
in 1989.  Convertible  currency  foreign  exchange  reserves  sisted  of short  tenn trade  credits, with  P-out 40 percent  of
werealmostdepleted.  TheexpectedctuTentaccountdeficit  the total owed to commercial  banks. Jfficial  reserves
foreach  of 1991  and l992 is expected  to  be US$1.5  billion.  amounted  to abo_. US$200 million,  equivalent  to about
Financial  support  for  the  program  is expected  to come  from  two weeks  of imports.
the official  sector,  with  commercial  bank lending  likely  to
be modest  Totalexternal  financingcommitmentscouldreachabout
US$2.1 billion for all of 1991. Most of the new money
The volume  of convertible  cumrency  imports  rose sub-  would  come  from  multilateral  lenders.  The majority  of the
stantially  in 1990  as the govenment sought  to make  up for  inflows  from  bilateral  creditors  are likely  to be in the form
production shortfalls and meet increased consumption  of government  guarantees  of suppliers'credits.  According
Table  14: Romania:  External  Debt (in US$ million)
L98  1987  12Q  129  199  12291  1922
Convertible  Currency
External  Debt  6,592  6,859  2,798  582  518  2,151  3,794
of which MLT  5,649  6,063  2,605  269  167  1,166  2,785
ST  943  796  193  313  352  985  1,009
By Creditor
IFIs  2,672  2,670  905  0  0  1,059  2,238
Bilateral  1,483  1,945  1,257  284  266  513  740
Commercial  Banks  2,334  2,144  536  248  252  451  570
of which  MLT  1,615  1,765  441  1  0  20  45
ST  719  379  95  247  252  431  525
Other Private  Creditors  103  100  100  50  0  128  247
Reserves  excl. Gold  582  1,402  780  1,859  524  838  1,177
DepositsinBISBanks  638  1,387  811  1,843  584
Source: mI,  Country  Report  dated,  November  20, 1991
23to  authorities,credit  lines from  western  governments  alrdy  National  Bank of Romania The loan was to have been
amount  to some  US$600  million,  but lack of proper  invest-  conditioned  on the successful  implementation  of the IMF
mentprojects  have  delayed  their  disbursement,  and  the likeli-  program  and the disbursement  of the last tranche of the
hoodis  thatnomorethanUS$300million  would  bedisbursed  standby  arrangement  in  early 1992.
in 1991.  Convertible  currency  external  debt  could  rise  to US$2.6
Lendingbycommercialbanksisistilllimited.Asyndicated billion by end-1991.  Most would be MLT and owed to
loanofUS$100millionwithaoneyearmaruritywasreporedy official  creditors.  Foreign  exchange  reserves  could  rise  from
underpreparationin  May 1991,buthassincebeendelayeddue  US$0.2billion  toUS$0.9  billion,  which  wouldbeequivalent
topoliticaldevelopments.TheborrowerwouldbetheRomanian  to 1.' months  of imports  of goods  and services.
Bank  for  Foreign  Trade,  with  the loan  being  guaranteed  by  the
Table 15: Romania's External Financing Flows (in US$  million)
L98  18  199  12  i
External  Borrowing,  Net  -3,595  -1,695  -77  1,620  1,725
of which
Commercial  Banks  1,582  -278  -6  200  125
Disbursements  0  5  -1  20  25
Repayments  1,320  -432  0  0  0
Due  -247  -95  0  0  0
Pre-payments  -1,073  -337  0  0  0
ST,  net  -262  149  -5  180  100
Other :'rivate Creditors,  Net  -5  -14  -52  125  125
Disbursements  23  26  0  75  75
Repayments  -51  -29  -29  0  0
STCredits,Net  23  -11  -23  50  50
Source: HF,  Country  Reports.
24ANNEX  1
PRESENCE  OF  CEE  IN  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CAPITAL  MARKETS
Bond  Issues  in:
1990  and  1991
Size/issue  Preoo  Issuer  Maturity  CouponN/ild  Lead  Manager  Guarantee  Type  of Bond
DM  250m/1  00.75  Obchodni  Banka  7i90-8/96  10.0%/N.A  Commerzbank  Unsecured  EURO
DM350m/101  Obchodni  Banka  9/90-10/95  10.0%NOA  Deutsche  Bank  Unsecured  EURO
Y  5 bn/l  O0  Obchodni  Banka  12912/95  8.30°h  Yamaichi  LTCB  SAMURAI/PP
USS20ml99.61  Statni  Banka  11/91-11/94  9.0%/9.152%  Nomura  EURO
YlObn/lOO  ObchodniBanka  11/91-11/97  8.50%o  Nomura  SAMURAI/PP
US$  200ml99.61  Statni  Banka  12/91-12/94  9.001%  Nomura  EURO
Bond  Issues:
1989,1990  and  1991
Size/lissue  Price  Issuer  Maturity  Coupon/Yie  Lead  Manager  Guarantee  Type  of  Bond
DM200m/100  National  Bank  of  Hungary  2/89-2/96  6.625%o/NA  Bayerische  Vereinsbank  NA  EURO
Intemational
YlObn/100  National  Bank  of  Hungary  2/89-396  6.4%/NA  IBJ  NA  SAMURAIVPP
DM200milOO  National  Bank  of  Hungary  2/89-/97  8.00/NA  DG  Bank  NA  EURO
Y40bVW9.65  National  Bank  of  Hungary  3189-10/97  6.3°/NA  Daiwa  Securities  NA  SAMURAUPP
Y30bn/100.5  National  Bank  of  Hungary  3/89-10198  5.9 0/JNA  Daiwa  Secunt  ies  NA  SAMURAVPP
Y20bn/1  00  National  Bank  of  Hungary  3/89-2/97  5.7%/NA  Daiwa  Securities  NA  SAMURAI/PP
Y25bn/99.73  National  Bank  of  Hungary  3/89-3/98  5.7%/NA  Daiwa  Secunties  NA  SAMURAUPP
Y35bn/100.9  National  Bank  of  Hungary  3/89-3/9  5.7%/NA  Daiwa  Secunties  NA  SAMURAIPP
Y25brV100.5  National  Bank  of  Hungary  3/89-99  6.0%/JNA  Daiwa  Securties  NA  SAMURAI/PP
ECU75m/101.88  National  Bank  of  Hungary  9/89-9/96  10.0%/NA  Kredietbank  SA,  NA  EURO
Luxembourg
ASchl500m/NA  National  Bank  of  Hungary  9/89-9/96  8.25%/NA  Oesterreichische  NA  NA
Laenderbank
Y25bn/1  00.5  National  Bank  of  Hungary  9/89-9/  6.0%YNA  Daiwa  Securties  NA  SAMURAVPP
DM300m/100  National  Bank  of  Hungary  290-M27  10.0%/oNA  Commerzbank  NA  EURO
ASchl000m/99.45 National  Bank  of  Hungary  2/90-2/97  9.5%/aNA  Creditanstalt  Bankverein  NA  EURO
DM200m/'00  National  Bank  of  Hungary  5/90-5/96  9.75%INA  DG  Bank  Deutsche  NA  EURO
Genossenschaftsbank
US$200m/99.6  State  Development  8/90-8/00  1  0.50o/NA  Daiwa  Europe  Govt.  EURO
Instute  Guarantee
ASch500m/99  National  Bank  of  Hungary  9/0-9/7  10.75%  Oesterroichische  NA  EURO
Laenderbank
Y15bn/100.5  National  Bank  of  Hungary  11/90-11/95  9.0%/8.86%  Daiwa  Securtlies
YlObn/100.8  National  Bank  of  Hungary  11/90-11/95  9.0%/8.77%  Daiwa  Securities
DM200m/99.75  NationalBankofHungary  391-3/96  10.5%/11.11%  Commerzbank  NA  EURO
DM150m/100  National  Bank  of  Hungary  4S91.4/96  10.5YolNA  Commerzbank  NA  EURO
DM200m/NA  National  Bank  of  Hungary  5/91  (paper  Fixed,  floating  Deutsche  Bank  NA  EURO
maturities  are  and  zero  coupon
variable:
2-30  years)
SFr30m/100.5  Phoenix  6/91-68  7.00%  Bank  Leu  NA  Straighg
Private
U.S$100m/97.2  National  Bank  of  Hungary  7191-7/98  10.5%/l  1.263%  Bankers  Trust  NA  EURO
ECU200m/99.125 National  Bank  of  Hungary  9/91*9896  12.00%  CFSB  EURO
DM500m/100.5  NalionalBankof  Hungary  10/91-10/98  10.75%  DresdnerBank  EURO
Y20bn/100.5  National  Bank  of  Hungary  10/91-10/98  8.7Y-8.58%  Daiwa  Secunties
Y30bnl100.6  National  Bank  of  Hungary  12/91-12/2001  8.00%  Daiwa  Securities  Samurai/Public
Y30bn/101  National  Bank  of  Hungary  192-1/2002  7.0%/6.83%  Daiwa  Securities  Samurai/Public
DM600m/100.25  National  Bank  of  Hungary  1/92-119S  10.25%  Deutsche  Bank  Non  callable:
Fees  Z25/
1.375
Source:  Based  on  informaton  compiled  by  Frank  Burdette  -CFSPS  2 5Bibliography
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